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INTRODUCTION
"[T]he Court's religion-clause jurisprudence . . . has been de-
scribed by scholars of all persuasions, and even by the justices them-
selves, as unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable."1 Lower courts
await instruction from the Supreme Court on the ambiguities in relig-
ion clause jurisprudence. Controversies that have arisen regarding a
procedure that enables Orthodox Jews to carry and push objects out-
side on the Sabbath, elucidate many of the holes and incoherencies
in First Amendment jurisprudence. This comment uses the creation
of an eruv, the name of this procedure, as a case-study to display the
ambiguities of current First Amendment law and the need for more
specific guidance from the Supreme Court on what the Establish-
ment Clause permits and forbids and what the Free Exercise Clause
requires.
In order to understand the constitutional issues surrounding an
eruv, it is important to first grasp the concept of an eruv and its func-
tion in Jewish law. According to Jewish law, the Bible prohibits carry-
ing from a private domain to a public domain and carrying more
than a few feet within a public domain on the Sabbath. A house or
apartment is generally considered to be one's private domain. Only a
J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Profes-
sors Seth Kreimer, Edward Baker, and Sarah Gordon for their insightful discussions. I would
also like to thank the law firm of Weil Gotshal & Manges, the editors of the Journal of Constitu-
tional Law, and Dr. Daniel Kantor for all of their help.
I ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 109 (1998).
2 See, e.g., ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 306 (6th
Cir. 2001):
Perhaps the Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to tell us, if it wishes, whether
the Lemon test applies here as well, or whether this case is governed by the endorsement
test, or the Marsh test, or some combination of some or all of the various tests on offer.
3 The Mishnah on Shabbat lists thirty-nine categories of work prohibited on the Sabbath.
MISHNAH SHABBAT 7:2. Carrying is one of the forbidden categories of work. Id.
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major thoroughfare is considered to be a public domain.4 However,
the rabbis extended the prohibition on carrying to include areas not
enclosed on all four sides, and not intended to be a thoroughfare.
Such an area is known as a carmelit.' Thus, Jewish law permits one to
carry objects from one room to another in a house because a house is
one's private domain. It forbids one from carrying objects from one's
house to a park because a park is generally not considered to be a
private domain. Without an eruv, some are restricted to their homes
on the Sabbath. According to Jewish law, pushing objects, such as
baby carriages and wheelchairs, is subsumed under the prohibition of
carrying. Accordingly, a parent may not push a baby stroller outside,
and similarly, an observant Jew may not push a person in a wheel-
chair on the Sabbath.
An eruv results from a rabbinic leniency used to reduce the impact
of the prohibition on carrying within a carmelit. Many streets fall
within the definition of a carmelit.7 Understanding the procedure for
creating an eruv in a courtyard is instructive. In order to make an
eruv, residents must create a symbolic doorway on the side of the
courtyard open to the public." The second step is to obtain permis-
sion from non-Jewish residents. Then residents deposit food in a des-
ignated person's house, and a blessing, creating an eruv is said over
the food. Only after the symbolic sharing of food is complete does
the area enclosed become one private domain according to Jewish
law.
Creating an eruv in modern cities is more complex. First, a city
must be enclosed in order for the sharing of food to symbolically
convert the property into a private domain. Although I will often re-
fer to the geographical structure used to symbolically enclose an area
as an eruv, the word eruv actually refers to the food used to symboli-
cally unite the properY. The enclosure is simply a prerequisite. Ex-
isting walls and fences are used, but symbolic doorways are used to
bridge gaps. Today, the symbolic doorway may be constructed by
4 Many Rabbis hold that in order for an area to constitute a public domain, it must be trav-
ersed daily by six hundred thousand people. See Rabbi Hershel Schachter, The Laws of Eruvin-
an Overview, in HALACHAH AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 131, 137-38 (1984).
YOSEF GAVRIEL BECHHOFER, THE CONTEMPORARY ERUV: ERUVIN IN MODERN
METROPOLITAN AREAS 13-14 (1998).
Pushing a carriage is like carrying. See also Y. NEUWIRTH, SHEMIRATH SHABBATH, A GUIDE
TO THE PRACTICAL OBSERVANCE OF SHABBAT 17:6 (1984).
7 BECHHOFER, supra note 5, at 98.
8 The symbolic doorway often consisted of two vertical poles or beams of wood, attached to
a horizontal beam. MISHNAH 1, TRACTATE ERUVIN (introducing concept of tzurat hapetach).
9 SeeJoshua Metzger, The Eruv: Can Government Constitutionally Permit Jews to Build a Fictional
Wall Without Breaking the Wall Between Church and State, 4 NAT'LJEWISH L. REV. 67, 68 (1989).
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hanging wire or string from pole to pole. When existing wires are
used, plastic strips, known as lechis1 ° similar to the plastic strips used
to ground telephone or cable wires," must be used in order for the
telephone wires and the poles to be considered part of the symbolic
doorway.12 Disputes allegedly arise because poles are often owned by
the city. Additionally, where there are no natural boundaries and few
poles, creating a continuous boundary may require that the Ortho-
dox community erect its own poles on city property.
Some also view the need to obtain permission to use the area
within as controversial. Since it is impractical for Jews to go from
door to door seeking permission from all those who live within the
geographical area, Jews request control from a single authority. In a
city, Jews seek formal or informal permission from the city govern-
ment or the police department. Sometimes, a city will issue a proc-
lamation granting Jews the right to use public land encompassed
within the symbolically enclosed geographical area.'3 Then, one resi-
dent of a community accepts a specified amount of food on behalf of
all those within the enclosed boundary, a blessing is said over this
food, and the area within becomes one collective private domain for
the purpose ofJewish law.
Three distinct legal controversies have arisen concerning an eruv.
(1) allowing the construction of the geographical boundary on city
property violates the Establishment Clause; 14 (2) denying permission
for the geographical boundary constitutes a violation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause;' and (3) denying permission for the geographical
boundary constitutes a violation of the Free Speech Clause."
10 The entire vertical pole is considered a lechi. The plastic strip, therefore, is just one part
of the lechi.
11 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 184 n.26 (D.N.J. 2001),
rev'd, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
12 The laws that concern an eruv are complex. This type of eruv can only be built under cer-
tain conditions. See Schachter, supra note 4, at 149.
13 The proclamations do not have any force according to American law. Some proclama-
tions explicitly acknowledge this. See Proclamation of County of Bergen (Dec. 15, 1999):
The said eruv shall not be binding for any other purpose and this proclamation creates
no rights, duties or obligations enforceable in any court whether in law or in equity.
This proclamation shall not diminish, increase or affect any other rights granted under
NewJersey Law, nor shall it be deemed to authorize any physical construction that would
otherwise require permission from any local municipal county or state boards.
1 See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae ACLU of NewJersey at 1, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n (No. 00-6051).
15 See, e.g., Pl.'s Mem. of Law at 1, Tenafly Eruv Assn (No. 00-6051). The First Amendment
states, "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 155 F. Supp. 2d. at 173.
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More than a decade ago, two lower courts rejected Establishment
Clause challenges to the construction of the geographical enclosure. 7
The Establishment Clause challenge to the allowance of an eruv re-
cently reappeared." In Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly,
the defendants argued that permitting erection of an eruv on city
poles, when access to those poles is otherwise limited, raises Estab-
lishment Clause concerns.' 9 In short, the Tenafly Eruv Association
constructed an eruv without the requisite permission from the Tena-
fly Borough Council.0 The Council ordered that the eruv be re-
moved, and the Eruv Association requested a preliminary injunction
banning removal. Since the eruv in Tenafly consisted of existing tele-
phone wires, the central issue was whether plastic strips that Cablevi-
sion affixed to 183 utility poles in Tenafly at the plaintiffs' request
could remain where they were. 1 The Establishment Clause became
relevant because the Borough claimed that it had a compelling inter-
est in avoiding both an actual Establishment Clause violation 2 and
the appearance of an Establishment Clause violation.23 Although the
District Court gave force to the Establishment Clause concerns, the
Third Circuit held that allowing an eruv under the circumstances in
Tenafly did not violate the Establishment Clause.2"
While the discussion above deals with Establishment Clause con-
cerns if an eruv is permitted, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n mainly focused on the
possible free exercise and free speech violations if permission for an
eruv is denied. 6 The District Court refused to grant a preliminary in-
17 ACLU of NewJersey v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (D.N.J. 1987); Smith
v. Cmty. Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1985).
18 The Palo Alto City Attorney was confronted with Establishment Clause issues when the
Orthodox community initially sought to erect an eruv in Palo Alto in 2000. He noted that an
eruv raises Establishment Clause concerns, but that allowing an eruv probably would not violate
the federal constitution. He also mentioned the promised threat of lawsuits (claiming an Estab-
lishment Clause violation). See Palo Alto City Att'y, Report: Legal Issues Associated With Estab-
lishing an Eruv, Dec. 9, 1999, at 6.
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 145 ("Plaintiffs contend that this denial [to erect an
eruv] violated their rights to Free Exercise of Religion and to Free Expression under the First
Amendment....").
20 The Eruv Association had permission from Executive Pat Schuber, and did not know that
it needed permission from the Borough Council as well. See Pl.'s Mem. of Law at 4, Tenafly Eruv
Ass'n (No. 00-6051).
21 Br. for Appellants at 17, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir.
2002).
22 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 172.
23 Tenafly Eruv Assn, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
24 See id. (holding that city could deny eruv on the basis of the appearance of an Establish-
ment Clause violation).
25 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 176.
26 Tenafly Eruv Ass n, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
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junction holding that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their
claim that disallowing an eruv constitutes a violation of plaintiffs' free
exercise or free speech rights.7 The Third Circuit reversed.28 First, it
held that plaintiffs failed to prove a likelihood of success on their free
speech claim because an eruv is not protected speech. 29 However, it
also held that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their free exercise
claim because the Borough selectively applied its ordinance govern-
ing the use of utility poles.0 Since the Tenafly Borough recently
voted to apply for certiorari, the fight over an eruv in Tenafly contin-
ues.2' Despite vast amounts of case law interpreting the First
Amendment, what constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause;
what is mandated by the Free Exercise Clause; and what is a permissi-
ble accommodation, not required or prohibited by either, is far from
clear.
Part I discusses Establishment Clause concerns with permitting
the construction of an eruv on public property and Part II explores
claims that denying permission for an eruv violates the Free Exercise
Clause. Part III compares the strength of the claims under the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses and focuses on ways for courts to
revise free exercise law in light of free speech jurisprudence.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS
Section A outlines the development of current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Section B discusses various ambiguities inher-
ent in current jurisprudence. Section C argues that an eruv is a per-
missible accommodation under all circumstances and Section D sug-
gests an approach that will eliminate some of the ambiguities the
Court's current jurisprudence engendered.
A. Development of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
One of the major difficulties in religion clause jurisprudence has
been the struggle "to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which,
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
27 Id.
28 Tenafly EruvAss'n, 309 F.3d at 178.
29 Id. at 162.
30 Id. at 168.
31 Monsy Alvarado, Decision to Fight on Supported in Tenafly; High Court to Have Last Word on
Eruv, THE RECORD (Bergen County), Feb. 2. 2003, at L01.
May 20031
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other. 3  Over time, the Supreme Court has shifted its religion clause
jurisprudence to try and identify the proper course. Although the
clauses may at times clash, they share a similar purpose: to minimize
government involvement in an individual's religious choice."
One of the Court's earliest approaches to reconciling the two
clauses was the "strict separation" theory, prohibiting governmental
"aid" to religion.34 The Court laid the path for this approach in Ever-
son v. Board of Education. Justice Black wrote, "[n] either a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."' The Court invalidated many statutes using the Everson
analysis 6
Even during the Court's aggressive Establishment Clause days, it
recognized the principle of accommodation." The Court noted that
by upholding a law permitting students to leave secular classes early if
they left for the purpose of religious instruction, "it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs."
3
1
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court articulated a tripartite test for de-
termining Establishment Clause violations. 39  First, Lemon requires
that the government's action be justified by a secular purpose . 4  The
32 Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
33 Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Ser-
vice Providers, 46 EMORY LJ. 1, 25-26 (1997); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation
and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 45 (1997). See also BETTE EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION 18-45 (1997) (identifying the purposes of the religion clauses as promot-
ing free choice, protecting the sanctity of individual religious conscience, protecting the state
from religious controversy, limiting the role and power of government, and fostering inde-
pendent sources of meaning); Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious
Equality:Justice O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 837, 839-40 (2001) (noting that Justice O'Connor believes the purpose of the religion
clauses is to allow individuals to practice one's faith without government interference).
34 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-4, at 1166 (2d ed. 1988).
35 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (upholding the constitutionality of a New
Jersey program reimbursing parents for transportation to parochial or public schools).
36 In McCollum v. Board of Education, the Court invalidated a statute permitting religious
teachers, employed by private religious groups, to substitute religious instruction for secular
education during the school day on school premises. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
212 (1948); see also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (holding that
opening the school day with Bible readings and the Lord's prayer violates the Establishment
Clause). It did not invalidate all statutes in these early years. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 313 (1952) (upholding a New York statute allowing students to leave public school early in
order to attend religious classes outside of school premises).
37 Zarach, 343 U.S. at 314.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 403 U.S. 502 (1971).
40 Id.
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second prong asks whether the government action has the effect of
advancing religion, 41 and the last prong requires invalidation if the
questionable action causes "excessive entanglement" between gov-
ernment and religion. 2
Although the Court recognized that Lemon was a "helpful sign-
post[],"" it employed the Lemon test exclusively for eleven years until
Larson v. Valente. Larson invalidated a statute on Establishment
Clause grounds because the law expressed a denominational prefer-
46
ence. The Lemon test, the Court noted, applies to laws that ascribe a
uniform benefit to all religions, but a strict scrutiny standard applies
to laws that discriminate among religions.47 In Lynch v. Donnelly, the
Court continued to distance itself from Lemon, by noting its "unwill-
ingness to be confined to any single test ....
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch introduced the en-
dorsement test, a modification of the Lemon analysis.49 Under the en-
dorsement test, the purpose prong asks whether the "government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of the governmental purpose, "the
practice under review conveys a message of endorsement or disap-
proval."" The reasonable and objective observer determines whether
governmental action has the effect of endorsing religion.52 In recent
years, the majority seems to have accepted Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement approach,2 since Lemon has been the subject of harsh
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
44 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (applying the Lemon test).
45 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
46 Id. at 252.
47 Id. See Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld the constitutionality of a public funded chaplain,
and instead of using the Lemon analysis, the Court looked at the historical practice. 463 U.S.
783, 795 (1983).
48 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
49 Id. at 687.
5o Id. at 690.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Justice O'Connor's approach was not embraced immediately. See, e.g., Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) ("[T]he Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation
that constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs or of religion gener-
ally."); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (using Lemon to invalidate a
statute requiring employers to accommodate Sabbath observance of employees); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (using Lemon to strike down a statute providing a moment of si-
lence for prayer or meditation in public schools). Many courts have embraced Justice
O'Connor's aproach. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001)
(declining to hold that allowing religious groups access to school premises when a host of other
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criticism.5 4  However, despite the Court's espousal of the endorse-
ment test, it too has been the subject of rebuke.
In Texas Monthly v. Bullock, Justice Brennan hinted at a potentially
different test to determine what constitutes a permissible accommo-
dation.5' He looked at the scope of a law's benefit, whether benefits
to religion alleviate an obstacle to the exercise of religious choice,
and whether a challenged law creates an undue burden on non-
beneficiaries.7
activities is allowed is a violation of the Establishment Clause because children might think the
government is endorsing religion); Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)
(using endorsement test to invalidate student led prayer before football games in a public high
school); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana "Creationism
Act" because it endorses religion in its purpose); ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Ad-
visory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e consider it most unlikely that an ob-
server .... could discern an endorsement of Christianity in the words of Ohio's motto."); Am.
Jewish Cong. v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (1987) (7th Cir. 1987) (holding nativity scene in
Chicago City hall to be unconstitutional using the endorsement test understanding of Lemon).
But see Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (possibly cre-
ating an exception to the endorsement test for private religious expression in a traditional or
designated public forum).
5 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing invocation of the Lemon test to "some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)
(Kennedy,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Supreme Court's deci-
sions often question the Lemon test's "utility in providing concrete answers to Establishment
Clause questions"); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347-48 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the difficulties
inherent in the Court's use of the test articulated in Lemon); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rhen-
quist, J., dissenting) ("Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to fracture into unwork-
able plurality opinions. .. ").
55 Most of the criticism surrounding the endorsement test deals with the ambiguity in the
observer standard. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 34, § 14-15, at 1293 (indicating that the result of
O'Connor's test depends on the religious persuasion of the observer); Brownstein, supra note
33, at 849 (advocating that O'Connor abandon the neutral observer and develop the meaning
of the endorsement test through a series of judicial decisions); Theologos Verginis, ACLU v.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board. Is There Salvation for the Establishment Clause? "With God,
All Things Are Possible," 34 AKRON L. REV. 741, 765 (2001) (noting the unpredictability of the
objective observer test).56
See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 698 (1992).
57 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15. The Court holds unconstitutional a law exempting only pe-
riodicals published by religious faiths from a state sales tax. Id. at 17. The Court did, however,
remain faithful to the principle of accommodation. Id. at 18 n.8 ("[W]e in no way suggest that
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B. Ambiguities in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Court's failure to clarify which, among the tests mentioned
above, it has adopted, places a hurdle before any person considering
whether an eruv violates the Establishment Clause. It seems that the
endorsement test would supply the relevant analysis. It is unclear,
however, whether the endorsement test has completely supplanted
the Lemon analysis. Given the problems inherent in both Lemon and
the endorsement test,59 a court might opt for another available ap-
proach.
If the endorsement test supplies the relevant inquiry, the Court's
jurisprudence poses a second hurdle because one needs to attribute a
certain level of knowledge to the objective observer. Since judges
construe the objective observer differently, it is impossible to predict
the knowledge a judge would attribute to an "objective observer" of
an eruv.60 The inability to predict the level of knowledge imputed to
an objective observer ensures that one can almost never be certain of
the result in an Establishment Clause challenge.
C. Analysis Under the Establishment Clause
Both the geographical enclosure and obtaining permission, for-
mal or informal, from a governmental authority must independently
satisfy the Establishment Clause. This section argues that regardless
of the test employed both the erection of a geographical boundary
and the grant of a proclamation are permissible accommodations.
1. The Lemon Analysis
Since both a geographical enclosure and a proclamation have a
secular purpose, they do not advance religion and do not result in
excessive entanglement with the government; therefore, allowing
them does not constitute an Establishment Clause violation under the
Lemon analysis. The purpose prong of the Lemon test is rarely disposi-
tive because the Court does not frequently "go beyond a superficial
that all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account of
their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by
the Free Exercise Clause.") (emphasis in original).
58 Capitol Square Review, 243 F. 3d at 306.
59 See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of this approach).
60 See infra Part I.C.
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review of the government's stated purpose."6  One purpose for both
granting a proclamation and for allowing erection of a geographical
enclosure is to allow religious Jews equal access to public property on
the Sabbath.6 ' The proclamation does not dedicate a town to Ortho-
dox Jews. 63 It simply places them in the same position as other citi-
zens, who do not have a religious restriction upon them.
In addition, the Supreme Court noted, "it is a permissible legisla-
tive purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their re-
ligious missions." Consistent with this statement, it would also be a
permissible governmental purpose for the city to lift its restrictions
on the public right of way in order not to interfere with members of
the Orthodox community's ability to attend synagogue. These secu-
lar purposes apply even when a city maintains a strict "no use" policy.
If a city allows access to its property, it might have an additional secu-
lar purpose of complying with the Free Exercise Clause. 5
The second prong asks whether governmental action actually ad-
vances religion. Permitting an eruv allows some Jews to attend syna-
gogue on the Sabbath.66  It also might contribute financially to a
synagogue because it facilitates synagogue growth.6' Merely permit-
ting the removal of a barrier, however, should not and has not been
considered an impermissible advancement' 6 Here, the advancement
is incidental. For many Jews, an eruv will also profoundly impact secu-
lar activities.
An eruv passes the third prong of the Lemon test. It does not foster
excessive entanglement with religion. Examining whether govern-
ment action involves excessive entanglement with religion entails a
review of the "character and purposes of the institutions that are
61 Joshua D. Zarrow, Comment, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 477, 484 (1986); but see, e.g., Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking statute that mandated equal treatment for evolution
and creation science in the classrooms based on its purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985) (invalidating a law mandating a period of silence in schools because it had no secular
purpose).
62 SeeACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (D.N.J. 1987).
63 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 167 (2001) (noting
analogy between an eruv and dedicating a town in the name of a saint).
64 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
65 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 177 n.41 (3d Cir. 2002).
66 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (adopting an uncontested definition of an
erlv).
67 Metzger, supra note 9, at 86.
ACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (D.N.J. 1987); Smith v. Cmty. Bd.
No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1985).
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benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the re-
sulting relationship between the government and the religious au-
thority."69 In Long Branch, the court noted that aid was minimal even
though additional poles were needed, and all work was to be done at
the congregation's expense. In Tenafly Eruv Association, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit similarly noted that there would be no
government entanglement because the borough would not monitor
or support maintenance of an eruv.
2. The Endorsement Analysis
Under the endorsement test, the first inquiry is whether the Fov-
ernment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. In
accommodating the community, the city seeks not to endorse relig-
ion, but to allow Orthodox Jews access to public property on the Sab-
bath. 3 It might also have the interest of avoiding a potential free ex-
ercise violation.
69 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
70 Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
71 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 177 n.41 (3d Cir. 2002). See also
Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1297 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614) ("The fact that the city may
find it necessary to ascertain that the items are being maintained correctly does not constitute
improper aid or entanglement, rather it is similar to the state's burden of ascertaining whether
tax-exempt property is being used for religious purposes."). Additionally, the contention that
an eruv necessitates an ongoing relationship with the state is unfounded. Once an eruv is in
place and the proclamation granted, it is checked weekly by the Orthodox community, and
contact between government officials and the Jewish community is rare. The type of relation-
ship between the government and the Orthodox community does not cause "a kind of continu-
ing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize." Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also Long
Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1297 (applying the statement in Aguilar to the case of the eruv). In
Lemon, for example, the Court invalidated a statute authorizing reimbursement to Church
schools for salaries of teachers that taught secular subjects. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-10. The
Court noted that "a dedicated religious person .. .will inevitably experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral." Id. at 618. The excessive entanglement in Lemon thus involved
an ongoing, pervasive, and unavoidable intermingling between religion and the state. The eruv,
on the other hand, involves at least a one-time relationship with the state in order to establish
the boundaries of the eruv and to obtain the official declaration. At most, after permission is
granted, the eruv involves periodic contact with the state.
72 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Cf Jamin B.
Raskin, Polling Establishment: Judicial Review, Democracy, and the Endorsement Theory of the Establish-
ment Clause-Commentary on Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 761, 770 (2001) ("The real
inquiry ... should require us to ask not merely 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display,' but also 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
government's placement of religious elements in the display.'").
73 Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1295.
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The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of the government
purpose, the practice under review conveys a message of endorse-. 4
ment or disapproval. The objective observer acts as the arbiter of
whether governmental action has the effect of endorsing religion.
The identity of the "objective observer" and the way in which one
judges endorsement is a matter of debate. The standard is the"perception of a reasonable, informed observer."75  Courts should
look at the history, length of time, location, and content of the
display."' "[C]ourts should assume that 'the objective observer' is ac-
quainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes,"77
and with "the history and context of the community and forum in
which the religious display appears."'78 It is hard to believe how one
could "view" an eruv as an endorsement of religion by any of the
many "objective observer" standards. Since an eruv "consists of poles,
wires, and plastic strips found in any modern community that has
electricity, telephone, and cable-television services, "7 an eruv cannot
be "viewed" by most.
If, however, one posits that a "reasonable observer" shares the
knowledge of a select few in the Jewish community, understands that
an eruv is permanent, and knows an eruv's precise boundaries and the
history of the utility poles' uses, it is still unlikely an observer would
conclude that an eruv indicates government endorsement of Ortho-
dox Judaism. An observer this knowledgeable is also required to be
74 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
75 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). According to justice O'Connor, the reasonable observer is a "personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment." Id.
at 780 (citing W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
The reasonable observer "must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community
and forum in which the religious display appears." Id. at 780. A display does not endorse relig-
ion in Justice O'Connor's view if one passerby would perceive governmental endorsement of
the display. Id. According to Justice Stevens, the test is whether "a reasonable person could per-
ceive a government endorsement of religion from a private display." Id. at 799 (Stevens,J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). He adopts this understanding of the objective observer because of
the importance in taking into account the perspective of the reasonable observer who may not
share the particular religious beliefs it expresses. Id. See also ACLU v. Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the reasonable observer stan-
dard).
76 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989).
77 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
78 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-57 (2002) (noting that the objective ob-
server is familiar with the history and context of private individuals' access to the property at
issue).
79 Br. for Appellants at 35, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 01-3301).
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aware of the tension between the Free Exercise and the Establish-
ment Clauses and to analyze the display in light of the values the Free
Exercise Clause was meant to promote."' Thus, in Tenafly Eruv Asso-
ciation, the Third Circuit held that a reasonable, informed observer
would know that an eruv was allowed because "selective application of
Ordinance 691 renders removing the lechis a free exercise violation."
8
According to the words of the Third Circuit's opinion, the
strength of an Establishment Clause claim under the endorsement
test might depend on whether an ordinance was selectively en-
forced.8z However, even if a city generally maintained a "no access"
policy, a reasonable observer would be required to understand that
an eruv releases a religious burden on the Jews and allows Jews to par-
ticipate in secular activities on the Sabbath. This observer would un-
derstand that an eruv does not bestow a benefit on Orthodox Jews.
Rather, it merely places Orthodox Jews in the same position as other
citizens who, not having a religious restriction, are already permitted
to carry objects in the public right of way on the Sabbath.
Justice Stevens might argue that if some people would perceive
the governmental display as an endorsement, then an eruv would be
an unconstitutional Establishment Clause violation.
8
' The objective
observer who perceives an eruv as an endorsement selectively chooses
his knowledge. He is aware of an eruv's permanence, its boundaries,
and its religious significance. However, he does not understand the
function that an eruv is meant to serve: to place religious Jews in the
same position as all other citizens. He also fails to consider the values
of the Free Exercise Clause. 4 It is true that some observers may have
this knowledge, but the fictional person who has chosen to point out
only the unfavorable facts should not be the arbiter of constitutional-
ity.
Permission from the government should also not be perceived as
an endorsement of religion. Such declarations are "routinely buried
among hundreds of other governmental proclamations, many of
which express official recognition of and respect for religious groups
80 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83.
81 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 176.
82 Id.
83 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Allowing an eruv is consistent with the goal of the religion clauses to avoid governmental
involvement in religious choices. Since allowing an eruv does not induce others to become reli-
gious, yet disallowing an eruv disadvantages religion, allowing an eruv is consistent with the ulti-
mate goal of the religion clauses. Since an observer must be aware of the values of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, it would appear that this policy concern would be important regardless of
whether application of a city ordinance actually violated the Free Exercise Clause.
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and observances., s5 Similarly, as discussed above, it should not be
considered governmental endorsement because it serves merely to
remove a restriction.
Applying the objective observer test to a case involving an eruv
demonstrates its inadequacies. An eruv is not visible, and in most
places individuals do not know of its existence. However, it is possi-
ble to imagine a judge who would impute selective knowledge to an
objective observer. The flexibility of the objective observer analysis
strips litigants of their ability to predict the outcome of any Estab-
lishment Clause challenge.
3. Justice Brennan's Permissible Accommodation Analysis
Due to the problems with the "objective observer" standard and its
potential for distortion, Justice Brennan's approach to permissible
accommodations seems more sensible and less prone to abuse.6 Ac-
cording to Michael McConnell, a staunch supporter of accommoda-
tion, Justice Brennan articulated a tripartite analysis."' Brennan's test
uses the corresponding treatment of secular concerns as the baseline
for constitutionality, instead .of employing an amorphous objective
observer standard.
One must first ask whether the "benefits derived by religious or-
ganizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as
well." " If the benefits are widespread, then the accommodation does
not violate the Establishment Clause." The first prong of this test
would be satisfied if an ordinance granted citizens a widespread op-
portunity to encroach on the public right of way, and the Orthodox
Community built an eruv pursuant to that ordinance. In San Diego,
in response to the Orthodox Community's petition, the city changed
the Municipal Code to allow encroachments. 9 Such a law has a wide
array of beneficiaries. Since an eruv fell within the natural perimeter
85 Br. for Appellants Chaim Book, Yosifa Book, & Stephen Brenner at 35, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n,
309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-3301).
86 Justice Brennan's approach is not the test usually employed. McConnell argues, though,
that since Justice Brennan maintains a strict interpretation of the Establishment Clause, it is
unlikely that the Court will be more restrictive than his approach. McConnell, supra note 56, at
698.
87 Id. at 698-704.
88 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).
89 McConnell, supra note 56, at 698-99.
90 City of San Diego, California, Minutes for Regular Council Meeting of Tues., Feb. 13,
2001, at 6-8, available at http://clerkdoc.sannet.gov/legtrain/Minutes/2O1/min2OOlO213rin
(last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
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of the permitted uses, allowing it would not constitute a violation of
the Establishment Clause.
If San Diego had instead created an exception to its former no
encroachment policy, courts would need to ask whether "the benefits
alleviate an obstacle to the exercise of an independent religious
choice," or whether they create an incentive or inducement for mak-
ing that choice.91 Since an eruv enables carrying and pushing objects
outside on the Sabbath, the exception removes an obstacle to reli-
gious observance,92 and would be permissible. It merely allows reli-
gious Jews to do what others can do without an eruv, and thus, allow-
ing an eruv would not induce individuals to become religious.
The last prong of Justice Brennan's analysis suggests that chal-
lenged accommodations should be unconstitutional if they impose
substantial burdens on non-beneficiaries. 3 An eruv poses little or no
burden on non-beneficiaries. An eruv is not publicly funded, and
poses no safety threat, 4 and is not even visible to those who are un-
aware of its existence. Some might argue that there is a burden on
non-beneficiaries because "persons living within the eruv must be part
of that domain whether they want to or not."9 The concern that citi-
zens may not opt out of a nearly invisible boundary that has no mean-
ing on their life can hardly be considered an undue burden in light
of the countervailing free exercise concerns involved.
91 McConnell, supra note 56, at 698. Some accommodations may create incentives for one
to become religious. If, for example, the government affords religious people an absolute right
not to work on the Sabbath, nonreligious people will be induced to spend a few hours in syna-
gogue or Church in order to receive the reward of spending the remainder of the day at home,
when they would otherwise be required to be at work. See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions
of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 604 (1999)
(arguing that some preference for religion is permissible, but too much is not).
92 The eruv does not actually remove the religious obstacle, but it allows Jews to carry on the
Sabbath.
93 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15. The two parts of this test are derived from Brennan's state-
ment:
[W]hen government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not
required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly
or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the
free exercise of religion ... it "provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious
organizations" and cannot but "conve[y] a message of endorsement" to slighted mem-
bers of the community.
Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987)).
94 In Tenafly, for example, it was undisputed that the plastic strips used for the purposes of
the eruv were identical to those used by Cablevision in other areas of the city. Br. for Appellants
Chaim Book, Yosifa Book, & Stephen Brenner at 17, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly,
309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-3301).
95 Sullivan Aff. 6, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J.
2001) (No. 00-6051).
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4. Establishment Clause Challenge in the Free Speech Context
Although a full discussion of why an eruv might be considered
speech is beyond the scope of this comment, since that claim has
been made, it is important to address Establishment Clause concerns
in the free speech context as well. 96 In the free speech context, the
96 Although the District Court held that an eruv was considered speech, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n,
155 F. Supp. 2d at 173, the Third Circuit held that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of show-
ing that affixing lechis to utility poles was expressive conduct. Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 162.
In order for an eruv to be considered speech, it must convey a message, intend to convey a mes-
sage, and the likelihood must be great that people will understand the message. See Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). Analyzing an eruv as speech tests the bounds of all three
prongs of the symbolic speech test.
The biggest hurdle in determining an eruv to be symbolic speech would be finding that it
conveys a message sufficiently communicative to warrant First Amendment protection. The
Third Circuit noted that an eruv, like a fence, simply "demarcates the space within which certain
activities otherwise forbidden on the Sabbath are allowed." Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 162.
This conclusion is too simplistic given the complexity of an eruv. On one level, the geographic
enclosure is not just a boundary marker because it helps effectuate a change in the status of an
area, rendering it a private domain, which it was not considered to be prior to the construction
of an eruv. An ordinary fence, however, serves only to demarcate an area and enclose the area
within. Yet, according to Jewish law, even if a series of continuous boundaries are created, the
demarcated area is not a private domain according to rabbinic law unless there has been a sym-
bolic sharing of food and a blessing actually creating an eruv has been made. If the symbolic
sharing of food, from the perspective of Jewish law creates the private domain, then creating a
geographical enclosure is, like the Third Circuit said, a fence demarcating a private domain.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that regularly conducted conduct may, based on the
circumstances, constitute symbolic speech. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 294 (1984) (noting that sleeping may be expressive). While ordinarily building a fence
might not be expressive under the circumstances, it is possible that an eruv could be considered
expressive conduct.
Whether an eruv satisfies the intent prong of the symbolic speech test depends not on
whether speech that is primarily functional, but relays a message intrinsic to its functional ca-
pacity, is protected. The Supreme Court has not answered this question, but in holding that
computer encryption triggers First Amendment analysis, the Sixth Circuit noted, "the fact that a
medium of expression has a functional capacity should not preclude constitutional protection."
Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000). Rather, the question is whether the restric-
tion focuses on the functional element and whether it withstands scrutiny. See Universal City
Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that computer encryption is pro-
tected, but since the law regulated functionality element, it was upheld). IfJungeris correct, the
eruv's functionality should not exclude it from First Amendment protection.
Whether an eruv meets the last prong necessitates a determination of whether only visible
conduct is protected as speech and a determination of what percentage of the intended audi-
ence must understand the message in order for conduct to be deemed a communication. The
Third Circuit's analysis assumed that the symbol must be visible and that more than a handful
of individuals must recognize the symbol in order for it to be considered speech. Tenafly Eruv
Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 162. The Supreme Court's analysis, however, has focused on whether "the
message was understood by those who viewed it." Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974) (affixing peace symbol to flag may be expressive even though "facts fail to show that any
member of the general public viewed the flag"). A rule requiring that the symbol be seen for it
to be expressive may not be appropriate for an eruv, if one focuses on the complete geographi-
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tests mentioned above still apply. Since an eruv passes muster under
those tests, there is no violation of the Establishment Clause even if
an eruv is considered speech. Case law clearly establishes that there is
no Establishment Clause violation when religious speech is permitted
in a forum in which a wide variety of groups are allowed access. 97 In
Widmar v. Vincent, the Court rejected a university's contention that re-
stricting religious groups, when other groups were allowed access, was
necessary in order to comply with the Establishment Clause.9 The
Lemon test is satisfied in a public forum because the government has
the secular purpose of creating a forum for the exchange of ideas,99
and has a secular effect because benefits are widespread.100 The
Court also held that excluding religious groups from a public forum
would involve more entanglement with religion than would exclu-
sion.' °l
Similarly, if an eruv is considered speech, permitting it in a public
forum will not involve governmental endorsement of religion since
governmental property is open to a wide array of groups. Conse-
quently, an objective observer would not conclude that the govern-
ment was endorsing religion.0 2 Justice Brennan's test would also be
satisfied because the law has a wide array of beneficiaries.
An eruv should also pass Establishment Clause scrutiny even if it is
considered speech, and no other groups are permitted access to the
forum since it passes the Lemon and endorsement tests even if there is
no additional purpose of complying with the Free Speech Clause.
Some argue when other types of speech are disallowed from a forum,
allowing an eruv preferences religious speech over nonreligious
speech and triggers Establishment Clause concerns.1 3 Allowing an
eruv is not likely to "preference" religious speech. Each request for
speech must be subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny. If a re-
cal enclosure. Each lechi and pole do not convey the message that the entire structure conveys;
yet, an eruv is sometimes too large for any individual to see the entire structure.
97 Free speech doctrine differentiates between types of forums. See infra Part III.A (discuss-
ing the forum doctrine).
98 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
Id. at 272 n.10.
1oo Id. at 274.
101 Id. at 272 n.1l.
102 See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)
("[T]here would have been no realistic danger that the ... district was endorsing religion ...
and any benefit to religion or the Church would have been no more than incidental.").
103 Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995); Freedom from
Religion Found. v. Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Br. of Amicus Curiae
ACLU of NewJersey at 1, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J.
2001) (No. 00-6051).
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striction on an eruv fails the reasonableness test that would most likely
be applied if a wide variety of groups are denied access' 4 and restric-
tions on other forms of speech do not, permitting an eruv is not
preferential," but neutral.
D. Suggestions for Future Approaches
Brennan's approach, as understood by McConnell, seems more
useful in minimizing governmental involvement in religious choices
than the endorsement test. The objective observer test is unpredict-
able. It is either is too restrictive, and does not permit governmental
accommodation of religion, inducing nonreligious behavior, or con-
versely, does not adequately consider the effects of government ac-
tion on minorities. It also is flawed because it allows constitutionality
to be determined by an "objective" observer, who sometimes main-
tains flawed conceptions about the object in question.
An eruv demonstrates some advantages of the Brennan/
McConnell approach. It is more predictable, easier to apply, and
more consistent with the ultimate purpose of minimizing governmen-
tal involvement in religious choices. It focuses on objective criteria
that leave less room for dispute. Thus, instead of guessing about the
knowledge of the objective observer, and allowing a semi- or un-
knowledgeable outside observer to be the arbiter of constitutionality,
a litigant can look at the number of beneficiaries of a law, the effect
that the exception would have on the particular religious group, and
the burden that it would have on non-beneficiaries.' ° -
II. FREE EXERCISE CHALLENGE
In contrast to an Establishment Clause challenge that asks
whether a government may allow construction of an eruv, a Free Ex-
104 See infra Part II.B.
105 If an eruv is considered symbolic speech, restrictions are likely to be invalidated even un-
der reasonableness grounds since most circuits appear to use something more than rational
basis review, see infra III.A, rendering neutrality and compliance with free speech concerns a
reason to reject an Establishment Clause challenge. The argument that allowing an eruv pref-
erences religious speech raises questions beyond the focus of this comment dealing with what is
considered religious speech. The message conveyed is pragmatic, rather than religious. As
such, if an eruv is speech, it is not necessarily religious speech. It would be akin to the posting
of Church directional signs devoid of religious symbols that serve a functional purpose. See
Tenafly Eruv Assn, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
106 Although it has some advantages, it also has drawbacks. First, the extent of the burden on
non-beneficiaries will not always be clear cut. Second, it might allow extensive involvement with
religion.
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ercise challenge asks whether a government must allow construction
of an eruv. Section A of this section looks at the hallmarks of free ex-
ercise law. Section B highlights ambiguities in current law and Sec-
tion C attempts to apply the Court's analysis to situations that may
arise involving an eruv. This section will show that the outcome of a
free exercise challenge with regard to construction of an eruv de-
pends on the access provisions for use of public property, a county's
application of these provisions, and a court's interpretation of the ex-
isting framework set forth by the Supreme Court.
A. Relevant Constitutional Free Exercise Developments
Employment Division v. Smith0 7 and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah'°s dictate the Court's modern analytic framework for
deciding free exercise challenges.159 Under Smith, a law that inciden-
tally burdens religion, but is neutral and generally applicable, is per se
constitutional. °"0 In rejecting the compelling interest test that pre-
vailed in earlier cases when a governmental action incidentally placed
a substantial burden on religion, the Court exclaimed that, strict
scrutiny applied to every free exercise case "would open the prospect
of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obliga-
tions of almost every conceivable kind ....,'
107 492 U.S. 872 (1990).
108 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
109 From 1963 to 1990, legislation that placed a substantial burden on religion would be
struck down unless justified by a compelling governmental interest. Kenneth D. Sansom, Note,
Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exer-
cise Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L. REV. 753, 753 & n.4 (1999). The extent to which Smith altered the
outcome of a free exercise challenge is a matter of debate. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free
Exercise Clause: How Redundant and Why?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 109 (2001) (confining narrowly
the exceptions contained in Smith); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exer-
cise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 850, 884 (2001)
(aruing that under Smith and Lukumi, "religious liberty will often prevail").
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (upholding a law that bans all use
of peyote even though the law incidentally burdens religious practice without applying even
minimal scrutiny).
III Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89. In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), reinstating the compelling interest test for laws that burden
religious practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2003), but in Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court found
the Act to exceed Congress's enforcement powers. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
532 (1997) (finding that RFRA exceeds congressional power under §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment). The status of RFRA's federal application is not clear in the aftermath of Boerne.
Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions
from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2000). Lower courts differ on RFRA's application to
federal law. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (assuming
RFRA is applicable to the federal government); United States v. Sandia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1278,
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Under the Smith analysis, first one must look at the text to deter-
mine whether a law that burdens religion is neutral.11 If a law does
not target religion on its face, one asks whether the object of the law
is to infringe upon religious practice."' The next step in the Smith-
Lukumi analysis requires that one discern whether a law is "generally
applicable."' Laws may fail the general applicability test if laws tar-
get religion "through their design, construction, or enforcement."
' 15
In Smith, the Court, upheld a ban on peyote, even though Native
Americans use it for religious reasons." 6 In Lukumi, a city ordinance
prohibited animal sacrifice,"' but a series of laws exempted practically
all conduct except the religious exercise of the Santeria church
members."" Accordingly, the Court noted that the law at issue fell
well below the constitutional standard of general applicability. " 9
Under the Smith-Lukumi framework, if a law is neutral and gener-
ally applicable, it will still receive strict scrutiny if the law has in place
a system of individualized exemptions. 2 0  In an earlier line of cases,
including Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held as unconstitutional laws
1281 (D.N.M. 1997) (finding RFRA inapplicable to the federal government); see also Edward
Blatnik, Note, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Applica-
tion in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1998) (suggesting that the
RFRA is unconstitutional); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 (1994) (suggesting the law
is unconstitutional because it seeks to override a decision of the Supreme Court, violating the
separation of powers doctrine); Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applica-
tion of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (2001) (discussing the applicability of
RFRA to federal law). In the aftermath of Boerne, many states have enacted state RFRAs. See
Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 644 n.4
(1999) (listing state RFRAs). Thus, courts were generally left with interpreting the standard of
Smith, as interpreted by Lukumi. In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (hereinafter "RLUIPA"), imposing more exacting scrutiny on laws that
incidentally place substantial burdens on religious liberty. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). RLUIPA
is less broad than RFRA. A full discussion of its constitutionality is beyond the scope of this
comment, but it has been held to be constitutional by lower courts. See, e.g., Christ Universal
Mission Church v. City of Chicago, No. O1C-1429, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22917, at *24 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 11, 2002); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1211 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that RLUIPA is constitutional); Freedom Baptist Church
of Del. County v. Township of Middleton, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
Kaplan, supra note 111, at 1077 (discussing Sherbert's "hybrid rights exceptions").
13 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
114 See Kaplan, supra note 111, at 1077 (breaking down the steps in the Smith analysis).
115 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
116 Smith, 494 U.S. at 905-06.
117 Lukumi, 507 U.S. at 527.
118 Id. at 536.
119 Id. at 543.
120 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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that denied unemployment benefits to individuals who lost their jobs
for religious reasons, unless the government could prove that the law
had a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.1 2' Smith preserves Sherbert by creating what is called the "Sher-
bert exception." "In circumstances in which individualized exemp-
tions from a general requirement are available, the government may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' with-
out compelling reason., 12 Some understand Lukumi to have relied in
part on the Sherbert exception, expanding its scope. 123 In Lukumi, the
Court noted that because the ordinance "requires an evaluation of
the particular justification for the killing, the ordinance represents a
system of individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for
the relevant conduct."
2 4
In Smith, the Court also carved out what has been called a "hybrid
rights" claim. It noted that decisions in which the First Amendment
barred "application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-
iously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other consti-
tutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.
'
,
2
1
It mentioned that these lines of cases "adverted to the non-free-
exercise principle involved,' '12 6 but it failed to further explain the me-
chanics of a hybrid rights claim.
B. Interpreting Smith and Lukumi
1. General Applicability
A case involving an eruv raises the following questions: what is the
scope of generally applicable laws under Smith and Lukumi; and how
many exceptions to an otherwise generally applicable law are neces-
sary in order to strip the law of its generally applicable status? Al-
though it is clear from Smith and Lukumi that a neutral law of general
applicability receives minimal or no scrutiny, and will almost certainly
1 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Kaplan, supra note 111, at 1067 (citations
omitted).
122 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
123 See, e.g., Rader v.Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 n.23 (D. Neb. 1996).
124 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
125 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 882 n.1.
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be upheld,12 it is less clear what showing needs to be made for a law
to lose its status as neutral or generally applicable.' 2 Since in many
cases, ordinances governing use of utility poles will allow some uses
and exclude others, a case involving an eruv is likely to require a more
exact determination of general applicability than the Supreme Court
has already supplied.
A closer look at Lukumi and some lower court opinions attempt-
ing to fill the gap between a law that is applied only against religious
uses, as in Lukumi, and one that is uniformly applied, as in Smith, re-
veals that the Supreme Court has suggested an analytic framework for
analyzing cases that fall within this gap. In Lukumi, the Court noted
that the ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice were underinclusive
for the ends sought to be achieved. "They fail to prohibit nonreli-
gious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater
degree than Santeria sacrifice does."2'
Using the principle of underinclusiveness as its guide, some schol-
ars argue that Lukumi suggests that when a law is underinclusive, it is
not generally applicable. To determine whether a law is underinclu-
sive, first one must determine the governmental interests of the re-
strictive law at issue. Then, one must look at whether the law leaves
unrestricted conduct that endangers governmental interests more
than the conduct sought to be allowed by the party seeking free exer-
cise protection. In short, "a law burdening religious conduct is un-
derinclusive with respect to any particular governmental interest, if
the law fails to pursue that interest uniformly against other conduct
that causes similar damage to that government interest."
1 30
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a more nar-
row conception of underinclusiveness with regard to selective en-
forcement of an ordinance 31 to invalidate a police department's "no
127 In Smith, the Court does not even explicitly do a rational basis review analysis. Once it
determines that the law is constitutional, it holds that the ban on peyote is constitutional. Id. at
890.
128 Sansom, supra note 109, at 768-69.
19 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
1o Duncan, supra note 109, at 868; Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty,
40 CATH. LAw 25, 31 (2000) (understanding Lukumi to say that a law is not generally applicable
if other activities that cause harm to the same governmental interests are not regulated). See
also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J.
77, 119 (2000) (arguing for a similar approach, but suggesting that Lukumi currently does not
adopt this approach); Sansom, supra note 109, at 768.
131 The Third Circuit has not fully adopted the underinclusive approach propounded above.
It has looked only to what was allowed under a given ordinance, focusing on selective enforce-
ment, rather than underinclusion.
[Vol. 5:4
UNTANGLING RELIGION-CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
beard" policy. 132  The city allowed exemptions for medical reasons,
but not for religious reasons.' The court noted that the decision to
allow beards for religious reasons would not undermine the Depart-
ment's interest in fostering a uniform apVVearance any more than
would an exemption for medical reasons. In Tenafly Eruv Associa-
tion, the Court noted that lechis are "comparable" to the postings theBorogh lft i " 135
Borough left in place, demonstrating that the ordinance had been
selectively enforced.
An intermediate approach recognizes the principle of underinclu-
siveness, but is unwilling to consider failures to consistently enforce a
statute to qualify as a secular exemption. Others see the underin
clusiveness principle as key, but Lukumi only prohibits underinclusion
that "is so dramatic that religious exercise is effectively singled out for
differential treatment."37 This approach appears to be based on the
Court's statement in Lukumi that " [t]he underinclusion is substantial,
not inconsequential."
3 8
2. Individualized Assessment
There is also confusion in the lower courts regarding the scope of
the Sherbert exception. In Smith, the Court mentioned that some
neutral laws burdening religious activity may receive strict scrutiny
because they lend themselves to "individualized governmental as-
sessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." To the extent
Lukumi"" relied on the system of governmental assessments analysis, it
132 Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d
Cir. 1999).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 366. See also Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996) (requiring univer-
sity to grant student's request for exemption from on campus residency because an exemption
for religious reasons would not undermine the university's interest any more than the other
exemptions).
135 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167 (3d. Cir. 2002).
136 See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a zoning ordinance against a Church as neutral and generally applicable even
though the Church established a similarity between itself and permitted non-commercial enti-
ties); Booth v. Maryland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 n.6 (D. Md. 2002) (mentioning that failure to
consistently enforce rules against other employees does not count as a secular exemption); Rob-
inson v. District of Columbia, No. 97-787, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13774, at *29 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
1999) (upholding policy when some other officers who violated the policy were not similarly
disciplined).
137 Gedicks, supra note 130, at 115.
1 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993).
139 See Kaplan, supra note 111, at 1062.
140 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
141 Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
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might stand for the proposition that any time an ordinance requires
an evaluation of a particular justification, the exception applies.
Some courts adopt this analysis. The "Sherbert exception" has been
extended, among others, to include zoning ordinances142 and a state
university's policy exempting students from an on campus living re-
quirement.' In its most broad construction, heightened scrutiny
applies when the possibility for individualized assessment exists regard-
less of whether an ordinance has been applied discriminatorily. 4
At the other end of the spectrum, some strictly construe the ex-
ception and hold that only unemployment compensation cases fall
145within the exception's scope, narrowly confining the exception to
preserve only the Supreme Court's Sherbert line of cases. Others apply
the exception only when the statute itself allows for individualized
exemptions,146 but statutory categorical exceptions may trigger strict
scrutiny.141
3. Hybrid Rights
Lastly, lower courts are confused about the interpretation of the
hybrid rights exception.1 The Supreme Court has offered no guid-ance on what it meant with regard to the hybrid rights exception.
142 See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D. Md.
1996) (holding that landmark preservation law falls within the Sherbert exception); but see Corner-
stone Bible Church, 948 F.2d at 472 (holding that zoning ordinance does not meet the Smith ex-
ception).
143 Rader v. Johnson, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding that a university rule
requiring freshmen to live on campus, while neutral on its face, was not neutral when en-
forced).
144 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1222
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that zoning necessarily involves case by case analysis).
145 See id.; Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1547 n.10 (C.D. Utah 1992) (holding that
the Sherbert exception only applies to unemployment compensation cases).
146 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 394 (D. Md. 2002) (refusing to apply height-
ened scrutiny to policy prohibiting correctional service workers from wearing dreadlocks where
part of policy addressing facial hair had a medical exemption, but part of policy addressing
hairstyles did not); Robinson v. District of Columbia, No. 97-787, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13774,
at *28 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1999) (refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to policy prohibiting po-
lice officer from wearing dreadlocks where part of policy addressing facial hair had individual-
ized exemptions, but part of policy addressing hairstyles did not).
147 See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir. 1998)
(finding that school district's policy excepting fifth year seniors and special education students
from a no part-time attendance policy did not require strict scrutiny of refusal to allow Christian
home schooled student to attend part time).
148 See generally William L. Esser IV, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Con-
stitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (1998) (discussing different interpretations
of the hybrid rights exception).
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Professor Richard Duncan argued that what the Court must have
meant is that a less than sufficient free exercise claim, plus a less than
sufficient claim arising under a different part of the Constitution, to-
gether trigger the compelling interest test: "In other words, the cu-
mulative effect of two or more ,,artial constitutional rights equals one
sufficient constitutional claim.'
Some federal courts 15 as well as state courts have accepted this in-
terpretation of the hybrid exception. In First Covenant Church of Seattle
v. City of Seattle, the Washington Supreme Court recognized this in-
terpretation.15 1 The Church charged the city with violating its free
speech and free exercise rights for refusing to allow it to alter the
Church's exterior pursuant to a Landmark Preservation Law.'52 The
court applied strict scrutiny because "First Covenant's claim [in-
volves] the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with free speech.' 53
At least one court, however, has completely rejected application of
the hybrid rights claim. The Sixth Circuit noted that "it is illogical" to
hold that a state regulation violates the Free Exercise Clause if it
implicates other constitutional rights but does not otherwise violate
the Free Exercise Clause.5 4 "[T]herefore, at least until the Supreme
Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary
depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we
will not use a stricter legal standard than that used in Smith to evalu-
ate generally applicable, exception less state regulations under the
Free Exercise Clause."
55
C. Application to an Eruv
In some circumstances, Smith and Lukumi clearly dictate that disal-
lowing construction of an eruv is a violation of free exercise rights.
However, whether a city violates the Free Exercise Clause will depend
149 Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy,
and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 430-31 (1994).
150 In Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, a church argued that the city violated its free
speech, free exercise, equal protection, and due process rights by excluding churches from its
central business district. 948 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1991). The Eighth Circuit held that the
zoning ordinance was neutral and generally applicable, and was, therefore, subject to minimal
scrutiny. Id. at 472. However, since the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's summary
judgment for the city on the free speech claim, it remanded for a consideration of the hybrid
rights claim. Id. at 473.
151 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 182 (Wash. 1992).
152 Id. at 217.
153 Id. at 218.
154 Kissinger v. Bd. of Tr. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
155 Id. at 180.
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on the way it has interpreted Smith and Lukumi. This section looks at
scenarios that could involve an eruv and uses those scenarios as case
examples to display the different approaches discussed above.
1. Applicability of the Free Exercise Clause to Eruv Cases
Before delving into Smith and Lukumi, it must be determined that
the Free Exercise Clause can require the governmental action re-
quired: (1) allowing use of its utility poles to create symbolic door-
ways (2) issuance of permission to use the property. Defendants in
Tenafly Eruv Association argued that the Free Exercise Clause does not
require governments to allow use of government property5. because
"[t]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the govern-
ment cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can exact from the government."'57 However, the Free Exercise
Clause also applies when the government "denies religious adherents
access to publicly available money or property"' 8 in a manner that
discriminates between religiously motivated conduct and comparable
secularly motivated conduct. 59 In Sherbert, the Court held that the
state was under no obligation to give unemployment benefits; yet,
once it offered unemployment benefits, it could not do so in a dis-
criminatory fashion.' ° Similarly, the state is under no obligation to
allow religious Jews access to its utility poles. However, once a gov-
ernmental body tolerates access to its poles, the Free Exercise Clause
is implicated to ensure that religion is afforded equal treatment.16 1
2. Determining the Level of Scrutiny
a. Neutral and Generally Applicable
A law that facially discriminates against religion and a facially neu-
tral law that masks the discriminatory intent of the legislators and
that targets religion will be invalidated. 62 In determining whether a
law that is facially neutral targets religion, Justice Kennedy looked to
1 56 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d 144, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2002).
157 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S 398, 412 (1963).
158 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 170.
159 Id.
160 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
161 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 144.
162 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) ("The
Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.").
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the events surrounding the law's enactments, "including contempo-
raneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.'
63
Thus, courts should look at residents' statements at council meetings
discussing an eruv, as well as statements by council members' to de-
termine whether a law targets religion.
64
Tenafly Eruv Association demonstrates the difficulty in proving dis-
crimination from statements made by council-members. Despite bla-
tant discriminatory comments at council meetings, 65 the District
Court held that the law at issue was neutral because council-members
did not explicitly state discriminatory reasons for denying permission
166for an eruv.
In adopting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, Senator Hatch noted that discrimination within city councils
"lurks behind ... vague and universally applicable reasons"167 and that
such forms of "discrimination are very widespread,"' 68 and thus, it
would be nearly impossible for an Orthodox community to succeed
on these grounds. The difficulty in uncovering discrimination is ex-
acerbated because the decision often involves a multi-member body
163 Id. at 540.
1 See id. at 541 ("The minutes ... evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, mem-
bers of the city council, and other city officials .. ").
165 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152-58 (D.N.J. 2001)
(displaying comments from a council meeting).
166 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
167 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
168 Id. Senator Hatch discussed the discrimination against religious organizations generally,
but there have been many instances where Orthodox Jews have been singled out. In its Amicus
Brief, the Agudath Israel of America notes:
At stake in (the Tenafly case) is not merely the narrow question of whether Tenafly is
free to refuse a community group's request for permission to construct an eruv ... but
also whether a municipality is free to exercise its decision-making authority in a manner
designed to discourage OrthodoxJews from living in the municipality.
Br. of Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America at 1, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly,
309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-3301). In the zoning context, an issue that arises slightly
more frequently, there have been many examples of anti-Orthodox feeling. In Beachwood,
Ohio, the zoning commission voted to prevent the town's Orthodox residents from construct-
ing several religious buildings. Rona S. Hirsch, Love Thy Neighbor?, BALT.JEWISH TIMES, Feb. 9,
2001, at 1. A reporter explained,
[a]t the crux of the animosity was resistance by longtime secular Jewish residents to a
perceived onslaught of Orthodox families about to move in and take over their upscale
neighborhood-reconfiguring houses for their large families, destroying quality public
schools, and introducing a brand ofJudaism they had little affinity for.
Id. Similar situations arose in Hancock Park, California, New Rochelle, New York, Longbeach,
and Ramapo. Br. of Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of American at 4-5, Te-nafly Eruv Ass'n (No.
01-3301).
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and "it is virtually impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a
collective legislative body." 9
Since it is unlikely that a law will target religion on its face, and it
will be difficult for a plaintiff to prove discrimination through legisla-
tive history alone, a case involving an eruv is likely to fall within one of
the Court's gray areas, demanding a determination of whether an or-
dinance governing the use of city property is generally applicable. If
a city council granted nearly all requests for use of its utility poles, but
denied only the request for use of the poles by the Orthodox com-
munity, then "the effect ... in its real operation"" indicates that al-
though the law may be neutral on its face, it is not neutral in its ap-
plication. It could not be deemed generally applicable because it
would restrict only Orthodox Jews in operation. This case would be
identical to Lukumi, and strict scrutiny would apply. At the other end
of the spectrum, if an ordinance provided that "no person is allowed
to use city property," then it would appear to fall directly under Smith.
Minimal or no review would appl unless the ordinance fell under
the Sherbert or "hybrid" exceptions.
In many towns, many uses will be prohibited, while some are per-
mitted. Under the Third Circuit's approach in Tenafly Eruv Associa-
tion, a court should look at the purpose of an ordinance restricting
access to the public right of way, and examine whether the religious
exemption sought undermines the purpose of the ordinance to the
same or lesser degree than the city's express or tacit secular exemp-
tions to the ordinance. In Tenafly, the Borough tacitly or expressly
granted exemptions from its ordinance, generally prohibiting the use
of city property, to allow house numbers, lost animal signs, holiday
displays, and orange ribbons to be hung on utility poles.' The court
reasoned that the Borough's selective application of its ordinance
"devalues Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting items on utility poles
by 'judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons,
and thus, applied strict scrutiny.
The ordinance in Tenafly was not nearly as underinclusive as the
ordinance in Lukumi, as others were arguably subject to the ordi-
nance's scope, 74 but the underinclusion could potentially be consid-
ered substantial. Suppose a town with an ordinance that states "all
169 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993).
170 Id. at 535.
171 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
172 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 167.
173 Id. at 168.
14 Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact & Final Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pl.'s Application for a
Prelim. Inj. and Other Relief at 6, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n (No. 00-6051).
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who want to use the public right of way must apply for a permit" did
not enforce its ordinance against a local mall that placed Christmas
lights on utility poles because Christmas lights promote shopping and
will be economically beneficial to the neighborhood. However, the
city has refused every one of its numerous other requests for pole use.
In this hypothetical, the law does not come close to targeting relig-
ion, as every entity that previously applied for access was denied.
Thus, under the approach that Lukumi requires, that religious exer-
cise be singled out, an eruv association's claim would clearly be
deemed neutral and generally applicable and minimal review would
apply.
Conversely, under an interpretation adopted by the Third Circuit,
heightened scrutiny would clearly apply. The permitted use, affixing
Christmas lights, stands in the same relationship to the city's interests
in enforcing its ordinance as does the "affixing of plastic strips to util-
ity poles" for the purpose of allowing an eruv. Under the Third Cir-
cuit's approach, then, what matters is only the relationship between
any exception and the stated purpose of the ordinance, rather than
the number of exceptions.
Even under an approach that does not require substantial under-
inclusion, an eruv may not always stand in the same relationship to
permitted requests. An eruv is generally unobtrusive, but it some-
times requires that an eruv association erect several of its own poles in
order to allow a boundary to be continuous. 17' Allowing cable com-
panies to build utility poles does not constitute a secular exception
because they further the government's purpose of facilitating tele-
175 One could imagine a situation where a city had an ordinance that permitted uses only if
they furthered the economic interests of the city. Under such an ordinance, the city would ar-
gue that Christmas lights further the city's business. Even under this scenario, however, the
Eruv Association could argue that an eruv encourages Orthodox Jews to move to the neighbor-
hood, and could thereby have a significant impact on real estate prices. The city could re-
spond, that if a group has promised to sue, an eruv does not further the economic interests of
the city, while Christmas lights do. Thus, in such a case, lechis would arguably not stand in the
same relationship to the purposes of the law as Christmas lights. Alternately, one could imagine
a similar claim where an ordinance requires that citizens apply for permits to use city property,
but further states that permits should be granted except when they have the potential for caus-
ing economic harm to the city. Here, although many uses are permitted, a city would argue
that a law is not underinclusive. Orange ribbons, house signs, lost animal signs do not have the
potential for causing economic harm. The city would argue that an eruv undermines the pur-
pose of this version of the ordinance more than the uses that are permitted, and therefore, the
ordinance is not underinclusive. This hypothetical also raises a question about how broad the
city's interests may be.
176 See generally Gaspar Gonzalez, Strings Attached: Orthodox Jews in Miami Beach Consider It a
Harmless Symbol, but Others Believe It Violates the US. Constitution, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002
(describing an eruv in Miami Beach, Florida).
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communication, which an eruv does not."' Under a-general underin-
clusive analysis, each other form of "visual clutter" should be analyzed
against the types of clutter that the city has already permitted and the
extent of the clutter. When a city already has many utility poles every
several blocks, adding five utility poles to several hundred does not
increase visual clutter any more than Christmas lights on town wires.
Conversely, if a city had its wires underground, and the Jewish com-
munity needed to build all of its own utility poles, the poles might
undermine the city's interest in avoiding visual blight more than any
already permitted use. 78
In short, an ordinance that flatly prohibits use of public property,
but contains several exemptions within the statute will be deemed not
neutral and generally applicable in some jurisdictions, if the secular
exceptions are not any more consistent with the purpose of the stat-
ute than an eruv. A statute that prohibits access, but in practice allows
many exemptions not consistent with the purpose of the ordinance,
will be reviewed with strict scrutiny in fewer jurisdictions. In some ju-
risdictions, it appears that if an ordinance is not uniformly enforced
and allows even a small number of exceptions or one exception in-
consistent with the purpose of the ordinance, a lower court might
apply heightened scrutiny.
b. Individualized Assessment
Given the various interpretations of the scope of the exception, its
application to an ordinance regarding land use is not clear. In Rader
v. Johnston, the court used a "system of individualized government as-
sessment" as part of its general applicability analysis. " Under the
broadest interpretation of the Sherbert exception, a law that allows
permits without carefully delineating when a permit is allowed clearly
falls within the Sherbert exception. Such a law invites an evaluation of
the justifications for the proposed conduct. In Cottonwood Christian
Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, a California district court noted
that "zoning codes necessarily involve case-by-case evaluations of the
17 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 168 n.29 (noting that plastic strips for telecommunica-
tion purposes are not a secular exemption).
178 The Third Circuit has looked only at whether exemptions to that particular ordinance
render the law underinclusive, not whether the law fails to regulate other types of secular con-
duct. For example, if the city's interest is avoiding visual blight, the Third Circuit used under-
inclusion only insofar as the statute at issue permitted visual blight.
179 Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 (D. Neb. 1996) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at
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propriety of proposed activity against extant land use regulations. '' "8°
This statement would seemingly apply to any land use regulation with
a permit system, even if the policy were generally to disallow uses.
Similarly, after noting that zoning codes necessarily involve a case-
by-case analysis, a Pennsylvania district judge held that the RLUIPA
simply codified the Sherbert exception."" RLUIPA requires strict scru-
tiny when:
the substantial burden [on religion] is imposed in the implementation of
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a
government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or
practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments
of the proposed uses for the property involved.
8
2
The holding that RLUIPA codifies the Sherbert exception is par-
ticularly significant. First, it specifically applies to land use regula-
tion. An ordinance governing the public right of way is also a land
use regulation. Additionally, RLUIPA explicitly applies to "formal or
informal procedures or practices.' ' 83  In contrast, as mentioned
above, and as seen in Robinson v. District of Columbia, some courts will
apply the Sherbert exception "only if the statutory framework at issue
permits individualized exemptions.' 8 4 If RLUIPA simply codifies the
Sherbert exception, then its scope is significantly broader than many
courts admit.
If the Sherbert exception is interpreted broadly, Tenafly Eruv Asso-
ciation falls squarely within the exception. The court noted Council-
man Lipson's concern that "[e]xceptions to the no use policy are
only allowed after a detailed application is made to the Council, and
after a determination is made that the exception would be 'good for
the town." 85 The standard "good for the town," is only marginally
more specific than the standard of "good cause"8 6 used to determine
eligibility for unemployment benefits expressly rejected in Sherbert.
Furthermore, the process Lipson described is one, like in zoning ap-
plications, which necessarily involves individualized determinations.
180 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Ctr., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1222
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middle-
ton, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
181 Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
182 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a) (2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2000).
183 Id.
184 Robinson v. District of Columbia, No. 97-787, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13774, at *21 (D.D.C.
Mar. 31, 1999).
185 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 164 (D.N.J. 2001).
186 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
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Using the different situations that may arise, it is possible to see
where the Sherbert exception and general applicability analysis out-
comes may diverge. If the Sherbert exception applies to any land use
regulation that does not specifically delineate the circumstances for
an exception, then even if an ordinance were not applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion, strict scrutiny would apply as long as a permit
system were in place. The relevant question would be whether the
potential exists for "individual assessment," not whether such indi-
vidual assessment has been made in a discriminatory fashion. In con-
trast, a law would not receive strict scrutiny if it were not selectively
enforced under the general applicability analysis even though the po-
tential for "individual assessment" exists.
c. Hybrid Rights Exception
The hybrid rights exception is unlikely to affect the ultimate out-
come of a claimant's case. First, the hybrid claim requires "a color-
able showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitu-
tional rights .... , Therefore, the hybrid rights claim would
seemingly only apply if an eruv is actually considered to be speech,
worthy of First Amendment protection. If an eruv is considered
speech, and a court decides to apply the hybrid rights exception de-
spite criticism,1 9 it may result in heightened scrutiny of the free exer-
cise claim. In Cornerstone Bible Church, a claim that would not have
ordinarily received strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause re-
ceived strict scrutiny because of its attachment to free speech rights. 9°
Accordingly, under this approach to the hybrid rights exception, if an
eruv were considered speech, it would receive heightened scrutiny
187 Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing
to allow religious home schooled student to attend public school part-time when fifth year sen-
iors were permitted to attend part-time). See also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1337-38 (D. Utah 2001) (following the approach in Swanson).
188 See text accompanying note 105 for a general discussion on whether an eruv can be con-
sidered speech.
189 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring):
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then
the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed,
the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech
and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid
claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neu-
tral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there would
have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned
the Free Exercise Clause at all.
190 Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991).
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under the Free Exercise Clause because the law burdens "not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunc-
tion with other constitutional protections. '"' 91
In Cornerstone Bible Church, however, the litigant had already pre-
vailed on its free speech claim. The "hybrid rights" claim has no ef-
fect on the ultimate outcome of the case if a litigant can satisfy the
standard of scrutiny applied to its other burdened constitutional
right. Whether a hybrid rights claim can ever help a litigant seeking
to erect an eruv will depend on the standard of scrutiny applied to a
litigant's free speech claim. As will be discussed in more detail below,
the standard of scrutiny for content neutral restrictions varies.9  If
the government could satisfy the standard applied in the free speech
context, but could not satisfy strict scrutiny then a claimant who
would otherwise lose, on both free speech and free exercise would
now win on his free exercise claim. It is unlikely that the government
will be able to satisfy the free speech standard."' Therefore, the hy-
brid rights claim would generally play no role. The government
would be required to allow an eruv pursuant to the Free Speech
Clause alone.
3. Applying Strict Scrutiny
If a law is not neutral or generally applicable, it "must undergo the
most rigorous of scrutiny . . . . [It] must advance interests of the
highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those inter-
ests."' 9  Tenafly maintained that the relevant ordinance governing
the use of utility poles sought to avoid visual clutter and maintain
control over city property. Other potential justifications for disallow-
ing an eruv are avoiding the appearance of an Establishment Clause
191 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
192 See infra Part III.A. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 48-49 (1987) (listing seven "seemingly distinct" standards of review that the Court has articu-
lated for content-neutral restrictions).
193 See infra Part III.A.
194 In Cornerstone Bible Church, the Eighth Circuit used an analysis similar to the underinclu-
sive analysis to determine the free speech claim, but rejected this analysis in order to determine
the free exercise claim. It noted that the free speech question was "whether the Church's land
use would impede the City's objective of economic vitality more or less than permitted uses."
Cornerstone Bible Church, 948 F.2d at 470. Thus, if substantial underinclusion is required, the free
exercise claim will fail, and the free speech claim may win. If substantial underinclusion is not
required, the analysis for both free exercise and free speech will be the same. There would be
no work for the "hybrid rights" claim, because regardless of what the label is for the standard of
scrutiny, a case involving an eruv would necessarily fail if the law is underinclusive.
195 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S 520, 546 (1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
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violation, an actual Establishment Clause violation, controversy, and
litigation fees.
The Supreme Court has held avoiding visual blight'916 and main-
taining control over property97 to be at least legitimate justifications
for restrictions on speech. However, "[w]here government restricts
only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact
feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial
harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justifica-
tion of the restriction is not compelling."""5 Thus, the Third Circuit
noted that the strict scrutiny analysis parallels the discussion of
whether an ordinance is neutral and generally applicable. 99 The
court held that since the borough tolerated house signs, it could not
have a compelling interest in refusing to allow inconspicuous lechis.'00
Furthermore, even if the interest is compelling, it would probably
not be narrowly tailored in any situation where strict scrutiny would
apply, because some other groups would always be permitted access
to the poles. In Tenafly Eruv Association, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit noted that since the borough permitted house signs,
but denied permission for the nearly invisible eruv, its ordinance was
not narrowly tailored to carry out the objective of avoiding visual clut-
ter or maintaining control over city property.' Since an eruv would
almost always be less obtrusive than any other request, a city cannot
permit other groups to have access, and deny access to eruv seekers
on the grounds that its ordinance is narrowly tailored to the compel-
ling interest of avoiding visual clutter and maintaining control over
city property. If, however, an eruv is significantly more obtrusive than
other uses, then a government may have a compelling interest, and it
might be narrowly tailored.
A city would clearly not have a compelling interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation or the appearance of an Establish-
ment Clause violation. The Court repeatedly held that although
avoiding the appearance of an Establishment Clause violation in the
absence of an actual violation is not a compelling interest, avoiding
196 See, e.g., City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (uphold-
ing law prohibiting the posting of signs on public property).197
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983) (up-
holding exclusion of non-majority union from school's internal mail system).
198 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47.
199 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 172 (3d Cir. 2002).
200 Id.
201 Id.
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an actual Establishment Clause violation is compelling.2 0 2  Since per-
mitting an eruv does not violate the Establishment Clause,20 3 this justi-
fication cannot be considered compelling.
The remaining interests also cannot provide the basis for with-
standing strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that the avoid-
ance of controversy is not a compelling interest. 204 Given the large
expense of the litigation in Tenafly,20 city residents and councils
might argue potential court costs as a compelling reason for denying
permission for an eruv. If the Jewish community agrees to indemnify
the city, then legal costs can no longer be a compelling or legitimate
interest.
4. Applying Minimal Scrutiny
Rational basis review requires that an ordinance be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental interest. Under ordinary ra-
tional basis review, "it is normally sufficient for the decisionmakers to
identify a rational justification that they could have relied upon to
support their decision. 2 0 ' Despite this low standard, a neutral law of
general applicability may not even receive traditional rational basis
review. Although a ban on peyote could have passed rational basis
202 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001) (finding that the
school has no valid Establishment Clause interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause viola-
tion); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (finding the
governmental program to be neutral toward religion); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (finding the school's fears of violating the Establish-
ment Clause to be unfounded); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (same).
203 See supra Part I.C.
204 In the free speech context, the Supreme Court noted that "the avoidance of controversy is
not a valid ground for restricting speech in a public forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985). Since a restriction in a public forum must be justi-
fied by a compelling interest, id. at 800, it follows that avoidance of controversy is not a compel-
ling interest at least in the free speech context.
205 Richard Cowen, Tenafly Faces $412,000 Legal Tab; Borough Taxes Fund Housing, Eruv Suits,
THE RECORD (Bergen County), Dec. 20, 2001, at 102 (noting that the borough had already
spent $412,000 to fight its two cases and was likely to spend more).
206 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (requiring that to pass ra-
tional basis review, there must be a showing of a legitimate governmet interest and not just hy-
pothetical governmental reasons).
207 Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1390 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a reli-
gious organization's use of a high school auditorium did not violate the First Amendment); see
also United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding law at issue based on
the rational basis test).
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review,2 08 the majority in Smith decided that the ban was constitutional
without explicitly performing a rational basis review analysis.0 9
If no review or traditional rational basis review is applied to an or-
dinance restricting access to the public right of way, it is likely to be
upheld. Maintaining control over city property and avoiding visual
blight are clearly legitimate governmental interests.2 0 These interests
are still legitimate, even though the city has chosen not to pass laws
that further these interests on every occasion .211 Arguably, disallowing
plastic strips is rationally related to the city's interest in maintaining
control over its property.
Even under rational basis review, though, disallowing plastic strips
is not "rationally related" to a city's interest in avoiding visual blight
in a case like Tenafly Eruv Association. Since the plastic strips used for
the eruv in Tenafly were indistinguishable from those used for tele-
communication purposes, an eruv would not cause any additional vis-
ual blight. However, if an eruv requires that a city build several addi-
tional poles, the city's interest in avoiding visual blight arguably is
rationally related to refusing to permit the construction of additional
poles.
Since the Supreme Court cases only hold that avoiding the ap
pearance of an Establishment Clause interest is not compelling,
they do not directly control the question of whether this interest is
legitimate. The Court, however, affirmed the principle that there is
not a strong interest in maintaining a higher standard of separation
of Church and State in the presence of free exercise and/or free
speech concerns.213 In light of the struggle "to find a neutral course
208 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the ban passed muster
even under the compelling interest test).
209 Smith, 494 U.S. at 889-90.
210 City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733 (1990) (upholding ban on solicitation
on postal service sidewalks, even though the government did not ban all activity that was disrup-
tive); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 811 (holding that government had a legitimate aesthetic
interest in prohibiting the posting of signs on public property even though it did not ban the
posting of signs on private property that cause the same harms as the posting of signs on public
progerty).
See supra Part II.C.4.
213 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001) (finding that since
there is no "valid Establishment Clause interest" the court need not decide whether avoiding an
Establishment Clause interest can justify viewpoint discrimination); Capital Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 762 (1995) (implying that if the Establishment Clause is
not implicated, there is no interest in justifying content based restrictions on speech based on
the appearance of an Establishment Clause violtion); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
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between the two Religion Clauses, 2 1 4 allowing simply the appearance
of the Establishment Clause to override a definitive interest in free
speech and free exercise fails to recognize the need to balance these
constitutional interests. 25 If a court protects the appearance of an Es-
tablishment Clause violation, then it drastically limits protection for
free exercise. Additionally, rational basis review might never be ap-
propriate for evaluating the justification of avoiding the appearance
of an Establishment Clause violation. Such a justification focuses on
the uniquely religious quality of speech and disallows speech solely
because it has a religious quality, singling out religion for special treat-
ment.
The Borough of Tenafly also argued that it had a legitimate inter-
est in avoiding "divisiveness and strife." Avoiding controversy that
would disrupt the workplace has been held to be a reasonable reason
to uphold governmental restrictions on speech. 1" Allowing contro-
versy to justify restrictions on free exercise even when the speech or
religious exercise does not disrupt the purpose of the forum effec-
tively strips religious minorities of their constitutional freedoms and
implicitly sanctions discrimination. The Supreme Court's opinion in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center implies that controversy based
on the irrational prejudices on community members is not a legiti-_. 211
mate governmental reason for disallowing a particular action. In
City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court used a more invasive rational basis
review to invalidate a city's denial of a special use permit for the op-
eration of a group home for the mentally ill based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.2 's The Court said, "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated.., are not permissible bases for treating a home for
the mentally retarded differently from [an] apartment."2' Although
the Court in Cleburne did not expressly mention controversy as a le-
gitimate reason, it discussed the controversy that arose surrounding
the special use permit for the group home. Thus, City of Cleburne im-
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (holding that unfounded fears of Establishment
Clause violation do not serve as a compelling interest).
214 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
2,5 See TRIBE, supra note 34, § 14-8, at 1201 ("The free exercise principle should be dominant
when it conflicts with the antiestablishment principle .... Such dominance is the natural result
of tolerating religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest
appearance of establishment.").
216 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) ("The
First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because
use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker's message.").
217 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
218 Id. at 448.
219 Id.
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plies that if controversy is based on irrational prejudices, then the
controversy is not a legitimate governmental reason.
In Tenafly, the council-members similarly based their decisions, on
negative attitudes and irrational fears of those living within the com-
munity. Some residents felt that an eruv was "'like a hostile take-over'
of the community."220 Councilman Sullivan stated that one of his rea-
sons for disallowing an eruv was a concern for his constituents who
opposed an eruv. In short, the controversy ultimately stemmed
from the fact that residents did not want Orthodox Jews to move into
the neighborhood, and absence of an eruv has that effect.
22
Claimants generally would not be able to prove that council-
members had the requisite discriminatory intent. If divisiveness and
strife within a community are considered legitimate, government im-
plicitly allows discrimination to trump free exercise because the
community controversy is fueled by discrimination against a particu-
lar group. Thus, the council-members would purportedly base their
decision, as did Councilman Sullivan, directly on the neutral reason
that the decision to permit an eruv would engender controversy
within the community or would create concern among his constitu-
ents. Indirectly, the decision would be based on the desire of the
community members to exclude the minority group and discrimina-
tory animus of the community members. Regardless of whether the
avoidance of controversy and courts costs are upheld as legitimate,
the government's interest in maintaining control over its property
would probably be sufficient to uphold a regulation under ordinary
rational basis review.
5. Governmental Permission
Until now, the discussion of the free exercise claim has focused
only on the construction of a geographical boundary. However, as
mentioned earlier, a valid eruv requires the permission of a governing
220 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 161 (D.N.J. 2001) (quoting
a thought expressed at a public hearing).
221 Id. at 168. Charles Lipson, also a councilmember, is believed to have said the following:
This is a very serious concern ... and it's a concern that I have that's expressed from, by
a lot of people about a change in the community .... [It's] become a change in every
community where an ultra-orthodox group has come in .... [T]hey've willed a change
in the state of Israel. They've willed it so much that they have stoned cars that drive
down the streets on the Sabbath.
Id. at 153-54.
222 See, e.g., Stephen Brenner Aff. 2, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n (No. 00-6051) ("My wife and I will
not be able to live with such restrictions and therefore if we are not able to have an eruv, we will
sell our house and move elsewhere.").
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authority for Jews to use the property. Just as the government has no
obligation to give unemployment benefits,
2 2 3 college scholarships,
224
or access to governmental property,225 it has no obligation ex ante to
give the Orthodox community the requisite permission. 6
The Free Exercise Clause, however, ensures that the government
bestows benefits in a manner that does not display hostility toward re-
ligion.2 2 7 Thus, even though a governmental proclamation is a bene-
fit that the government would not otherwise be required to bestow
upon the Jewish community, the Free Exercise Clause is implicated to
the extent that other similarly situated groups have been given similar
types of governmental proclamations. Plaintiffs in Tenafly noted that
many other government declarations exist, "many of which express
official recognition of, and respect for, religious groups and obser-
vances."228 The analysis for whether refusal to grant a governmental
proclamation depends on the number and types of proclamations is-
sued. In many areas-like the analysis for construction of wires-the
outcome would depend on a lower court's interpretation of Smith and
Lukumi.
If a government does not issue proclamations, the Free Exercise
Clause would not apply since the government is under no obligation
to issue a proclamation. If a city has a tacit policy of granting proc-
lamations, with no legal force, at almost any request, but refuses to
give the Jewish community a proclamation, the policy might single
religion out for discriminatory treatment. If a city granted some
proclamations, but refused to grant many others, under a narrow in-
terpretation of Lukumi, the policy or law would be entitled only to
minimal scrutiny. Under a broader interpretation, the analysis would
focus on whether a policy limiting proclamations is underinclusive:
whether granting Jews a proclamation undermines government ob-
jectives in limiting the number of proclamations to the same extent
22 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) ("Nor do we, by our decision to-
day, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part of all
persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment.").
224 See, e.g., Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Free Exercise
Clause prohibits government from conditioning grant of college scholarships on recipients not
majoring in theology).
25 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (finding refusal to al-
low Good News Club to use school property to be viewpoint discrimination).
26 The Free Exercise Clause is not written "in terms of what the individual can extract from
the government." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412.
227 See infta notes 241-243 (citing cases where the court required that benefits be bestowed
upon religious groups when such benefits were bestowed on non-religious groups).
228 Br. for Appellants Chaim Book, Yosifa Book, & Stephen Brenner at 35, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n
v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (No. 01-3301).
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as proclamations already issued." 9 It is unlikely, however, that a bor-
ough would be forced to issue the requisite permission.
The above analysis demonstrates that an inquiry into the Free Ex-
ercise Clause with regard to many scenarios that could involve an eruv
raises more questions than answers. Lower courts and scholars are
divided on where to draw the line between Smith and Lukumi on what
constitutes general applicability. They are also confused on the scope
of the Supreme Court's exceptions. Consequently, the outcome of a
free exercise challenge will differ based on whether Lukumi is under-
stood to give strict scrutiny to laws that are underinclusive or only to
laws that are substantially underinclusive such that religion alone falls
under the law's scope. The outcome may also differ depending on
whether strict scrutiny applies if a statute contains exemptions in
practice, or if statutory exemptions alone trigger heightened scrutiny.
In short, nearly all that is clear from the free exercise challenge is
that if the Supreme Court continues to follow the Smith framework, it
should give more specific guidance on how to determine whether a
law is generally applicable, and should explain the scope of the Sher-
bert and hybrid rights exceptions.
III. LOOKING TOWARD A SOLUTION
In addition to creating confusion amongst lower courts, Smith fos-
tered a debate amongst scholars and justices about whether the Smith
framework should be abandoned. 0 Some scholars and justices think
the Court should revert to the compelling interest standard em-
ployed before Smith.3 1 Others advocate the various ways suggested
within the existing Smith-Lukumi framework to maximize religious lib-
erty.
229 If the Sherbert exception were extended to its broadest possible scope, then it could argua-
bly apply in the proclamation context as well. If a city has no standards for whether or not to
grant proclamations, then there is a "system of individualized assessments" in place that allows a
governmental body to independently assess the value of a given proclamation.
230 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 109, at 884 (arguing that Smith and Lukumi together afford
the proper amount of protection without preferencing religion); Gedicks, supra note 130, at
121 (noting that the Smith doctrine erased religious exercise as a fundamental right).
231 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
id. at 909 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5:4
UNTANGLING RELIGION-CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Another approach looks to free speech law for guidance.232 Gen-
erally, scholars in this camp argue that where rational basis review
would be applied under a narrow interpretation of Smith-Lukumi, at
least some form of intermediate scrutiny would be applied under the
Free Speech Clause. Accordingly, free exercise jurisprudence
should adjust so that incidental burdens on free exercise are scruti-
nized at least as closely as incidental burdens on free speech.
The First Amendment's grant of protection to both religion and
speech does not mean that the two should be accorded the same pro-
tection. Professor Frederick Gedicks, however, offers compelling rea-
sons for why the Speech Clause should be used as a template for re-
developing free exercise jurisprudence. He writes:
[T] he Free Exercise and Speech Clauses... both extend constitutional
protection to those whose personal beliefs constrain them to oppose the
government or its laws. The Free Exercise Clause extends constitutional
protection to those whose religious beliefs constrain them to act in oppo-
sition to government; the Speech Clause extends constitutional protec-
tion to those whosepersonal beliefs constrain them to speak in opposition
to the government.
Two problems arise from treating religious exercise differently
from speech. Given the ambiguity in free exercise jurisprudence,
current law encourages litigants to classify every type of religious ac-
tivity as speech in the hopes of obtaining more scrutiny of govern-
mental activity under their free speech claim. Some would argue that
the free exercise exemptions should be eliminated and free exercise
claims should be brought under the Free Speech Clause.233 This ap-
proach does not eliminate the incentive to redefine speech in broad
terms to encompass all forms of religious exercise. Although the
Court has classified some religious activity as speech,236 the line be-
tween religious activity that constitutes speech and religious activity
that does not is not clearly drawn.
232 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 925, 930 (2000) (suggesting that some free exercise claims be treated like free speech
claims); Rodney A. Smolla, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: The Free Exercise of Religion After
the Fall: The Case For Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 925, 942 (1998) (arguing that
intermediate scrutiny should be used to govern free exercise claims); Volokh, supra note 91, at
656 (providing reasons for and against using a reasonableness test).
233 See supra Part III.B.2.
234 Gedicks, supra note 232, at 931 (emphasis in original).
235 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Clause, 40 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 357, 360 (1990).
236 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.6 (1981) (noting that worship constitutes
speech).
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Yet Congress clearly did not intend for all religious exercise to be
considered speech. If speech is defined broadly, statutes meant to
protect religious exercise would have no effect. Since preferring reli-
gious speech over nonreligious speech constitutes a violation of the
231Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause, statutes such as
the Religious Land Use Act, and state and Federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts would be meaningless. They would either be con-
sidered a violation of the Establishment Clause, or the compelling in-
terest in complying with the First Amendment would provide a rea-
son not to grant an exemption for religious institutions.3  In short,
affording religious exercise less protection than speech creates an en-
tire category of litigation, determining whether a religious activity
constitutes speech, the need for which would be eliminated if relig-
ion and speech were accorded similar protection.239
The conceptual message that arises from giving free exercise less
protection than free speech is also problematic. If the government
affords religious speech more protection than other forms of reli-
gious activity, it implicitly sends the message that religious speech is
more important than other forms of religious activity. This message
contradicts the purpose of the religion clauses. It encourages certain
forms of religious activity over others and chides religious groups to
define religious practice in a different light in order to benefit from
maximum constitutional protection. Thus, it might interfere in an
individual's religious choices.
Given these reasons for treating free speech and free exercise
similarly and the large overlap between religious exercise claims and
religious speech claims, understanding the standard applied to inci-
dental burdens on free speech is crucial to adopting a logical reform
of free exercise law that minimizes inconsistencies between the result
of a free exercise claim and a free speech claim.
237 SeeBrownstein, supra note 111, at 627-28 (discussing the application of state RFRAs to re-
ligious speech).
238 See id. at 627 ("RFRA cannot provide special protection to material because of its religious
content; to do so would violate the Establishment Clause and discriminate based on the content
of the material (violating the Free Speech Clause)."); Volokh, supra note 91, at 614-15 (discuss-
ing how one distinguishes speech from nonspeech in this context).
239 If religion is accorded more protection than speech, then one still has the problem of dis-
tinguishing when conduct is religiously motivated, as opposed to philosophically motivated. See
infra note 240, at 942 (noting that one of the advantages of according religious exercise the
same protection as religious speech is to eliminate the need to determine when conduct is relig-
iously motivated).
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A. Understanding Free Speech Jurisprudence
As mentioned, scholars have argued that religion cases are more
likely to succeed when brought under the Free Speech Clause.4° Al-
though true, where the use of public property is involved, this state-
ment is more complex. This section looks at the standard of review if
an eruv were considered speech.24' It focuses only on the minimum
amount of protection that would be accorded under the Free Speech
Clause for the purpose of comparing the default standard in a free
speech claim to the default standard in a free exercise claim.
An eruv would be analyzed under the Court's public forum doc-
trine, which is used to determine the constitutionality of regulations
on the time, manner, and place of speech on public property. 2 42 The
Supreme Court explicitly recognized three categories of forums: a
public forum, an intermediate category, sometimes called a desig-
nated public forum, and a nonpublic forum. The scrutiny afforded
to a law governing speech depends on the type of forum at issue and
whether a law is content-neutral. When a law discriminates based
240 See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 130, at 92; Smolla, supra note 232, at 941-42; Volokh, supra
note 91, at 655-56.
241 Although the analysis looks at an eruv as speech for the purpose of comparison, it seems
that a litigant would face significant hurdles in claiming that an eruv is symbolic speech. See su-
pra text accompanying note 91. There is a stronger argument that an eruv would be protected
as a facilitator of speech. Honor boxes, used to store newspapers, were entitled to constitu-
tional protection. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Deale Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988); S.
N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 542 F. Supp. 173, 182-83 (D.N.J. 1982). The
Third Circuit rejected the argument that an eruv should be protected because it facilitates wor-
ship because in contrast to honor boxes, "there is no evidence that an eruv is inextricably linked
to a communicative activity." Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 164 (3d
Cir. 2002). Although an eruv is not inextricably linked to worship like a newspaper rack is
linked to distributing newspapers, for some, it is the only way to facilitate this communicative
activity. This provides a reason to extend the rationale to protect facilitators of speech, at least
where the facilitating device is necessary for the speech to occur. Moreover, the geographical
enclosure is inextricably linked to sending a message that an enclosed area is a symbolic private
domain. If that message is deserving of constitutional protection, an eruv should be protected
because it is inextricably linked to speech.
242 In United States v. O'Brien, the Court introduced a four-part test for determining when the
government is permitted to restrict speech when speech and non-speech are combined in the
same course of conduct. The government may restrict conduct when it is (1) "is within the con-
stitutional power of the government;" (2) "furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;" (3) "if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;"
and (4) "if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968). Even though an eruv would fall under the rubric of the O'Brien analysis because it in-
volves the regulation of both speech and non-speech elements, the Supreme Court noted that
the O'Brien test "is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner
restrictions." Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (using both
O'Brien and the forum analysis to restrict symbolic speech).
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upon the content or viewpoint of a group's message, the restriction
receives strict scrutiny regardless of the forum. 43
"[P] laces which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate," like parks and public squares, are
considered public forums.2 44  The intermediate category, sometimes
called a designated public forum, is one that is not traditionally open
to debate, but one that the "State has opened for expressive activity
by part or all of the public."245 Restrictions on speech in a public or
designated public forum must be narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest246 and there must be ample alternative a
avenues of communication.247 Although the Court recognizes that a
government need not open its property to the public, once it has,
the "State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'rea-
sonable in light of the purposes served by the forum' 24' and "is not
an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to a disagreement with
the speaker's view."25
Since restrictions on an eruv are likely to fall even under deferen-
tial reasonableness review, a full discussion on when a law discrimi-
nates against viewpoint is beyond the scope of this comment.2 5' If
243 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
244 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
24 I nt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
246 Id. See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (upholding
television shows' exclusions of independent candidates from candidate debate). The standard
in the intermediate category is not clear. See infta text accompanying note 252.
247 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293.
248 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993).
249 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
50 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992). See also Forbes,
523 U.S. at 678.
251 In many of the Supreme Court cases, the defendant clearly discriminated against a reli-
gious viewpoint, leaving many questions unanswered for Tenafly Eruv Association. See, e.g., Wid-
mar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). In Tenafly, the Borough argued it did not expressly
open the forum to anyone. Yet, it tolerated some speakers, none of whom were related to its
ultimate purpose of using utility poles for the purpose of telecommunications. The question
then becomes whether a city should be allowed post hoc to define the category of allowable
speakers. Policy reasons, however, dictate that failure to set any meaningful boundaries should
not be used to insulate the State's action from First Amendment analysis. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at
690 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment does not tolerate arbitrary defi-
nitions of the scope of the forum).
In determining whether a law is viewpoint discriminatory, the extent of selective enforce-
ment would seemingly be relevant. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984) ("[T]here is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or
enforcement of this ordinance."). However, in the free speech context, underinclusion will not
lead to a finding of viewpoint discrimination because the Supreme Court has held that the
"First Amendment imposes not an 'underinclusiveness' limitation, but a 'content discrimina-
tion' limitation ... " R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992). See also United States
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there is no viewpoint discrimination, the next step is determining the
relevant forum. Although, the Court has affirmed that a designated
public forum receives strict scrutiny, it has not been entirely consis-
tent in what level of scrutiny to apply in its intermediate category.
252
Although lower courts have adopted different approaches, in light
of the Court's recent dicta claiming that the reasonableness standard
is the proper standard of review in a limited public forum, this
comment assumes that a limited public forum would receive only rea-
sonableness review.
Since the forum at issue is likely to be either a limited public fo-
rum or nonpublic forum,255 unless there is viewpoint discrimination, a
law that restricts the use of utility poles and other relevant property
would be reviewed under the reasonableness standard. In contrast,
under Smith, if a law is not generally applicable, traditional rational
basis review or no review is appropriate. Therefore, it is critical to
understand the application of the reasonableness standard.
Distinctions drawn between speech in a nonpublic forum must be
"reasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum.,,156 "Consid-
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990) (holding a ban on solicitation on postal service sidewalks is
constitutional despite the fact that other types of potentially disruptive speech were permitted).
252 In Perry, the Supreme Court described the intermediate category as a species of a public
forum that arises by government "designation" and that may be created for a "limited purpose,"
but it did not label the forum as a designated or limited public forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983). It has recognized that the intermedi-
ate category consists of a designated and limited forum. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678.
253 See Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Some courts and
commentators refer to a 'designated public forum' as a 'limited public forum' and use the
terms interchangeably."). Other courts recognize two distinct categories in the intermediate
type of forum. A designated public forum, indiscriminately made open to the public, is an
outgrowth of a public forum, and receives strict scrutiny. A limited public forum, with more
specific access provisions, is a subset of a nonpublic forum. Consequently, restrictions on
speech need only be reasonable. See PETA v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd, 18 Fed. Appx. 35 (2d Cir. 2001). See also, Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69
F.3d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 1995).
254 See Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (invalidating exclusion of reli-
gious publication from funding when nonreligious publications received funding); see also Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) ("[B]ecause the restriction is view-
point discriminatory, we need not decide whether it is unreasonable in light of the purposes
served by the forum.").
255 A full discussion of classifying the type of forum is beyond the scope of this comment.
256 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (holding ban on solicitation on postal
sidewalks to be reasonable). Even though in Lee, the most recent case actually decided on rea-
sonableness grounds, the Court does not expressly lay out the "in light of the purposes of the
forum language," its analysis looks at the purpose of the forum and the effect that solicitation
would have on the ultimate purpose of the forum. Lee, 505 U.S. at 682. In Good News Club, the
Court stated that since the restriction was viewpoint neutral, "we need not decide whether it is
unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum." Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
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eration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutional-
ity of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest
must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of
the particular forum involved."
2 57
The Supreme Court has sent different signals on how to analyze
whether a restriction is reasonable.25 s  In early cases, it seems as
though the reasonableness standard was a form of rational basis re-
view. The Court's most recent opinion in Lee suggests that the rea-
sonableness standard is more exacting. In Lee, the Supreme Court
upheld a ban on religious solicitation in airports, but it invalidated a
ban on leafleting.26° In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote,
"[b]ecause I cannot see how peaceful pamphleteering is incompati-
ble with the multipurpose environment ... I cannot accept that a to-
tal ban on that activity is reasonable without an explanation as to why
such a restriction 'preserves the property' for the several uses to
which it has been put."
26 1
The Supreme Court has held constitutional limitations on speech
in a nonpublic forum to be reasonable when speech, if allowed,
would "hinder [the] effectiveness" of the forum's purpose,2 62 or in-
Good News Club involves limited public forums, not nonpublic forums, and the statement was
dicta. The Court's omission of "in light of the purposes served by the forum," from its latest
cases actually decided on these grounds, does at least raise the question of whether it would
attribute to the "in light of the purposes of the forum" part of the test only to a limited public
forum. Many lower courts similarly look at the restriction and the purpose of the forum in or-
der to determine reasonableness. See, e.g., Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959,
966 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a law banning individuals from wearing clothing bearing sym-
bols of motorcycle organizations in federal court building was not reasonable in light of the
purposes meant to be served by the forum); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg.
Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1299 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The only possible issue remaining is whether Rule
13 is reasonable in light of the purposes served by the City-County Building lobby.").
257 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732 (quoting Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981)).
2 Id. at 730.
259 In Perry, a non-majority union sought to gain access to the school district's internal mail
system. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The Court held
that the limitation on speech was reasonable because the restriction was "wholly consistent" with
the district's legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to which it was dedicated.
Id. at 50-51. In addition, the Court stated that the policy "need only rationally further a legiti-
mate state purpose." Id. at 54.
260 Lee, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992) (invalidating restriction based on the reasons set forth in
O'Connor's concurrence).
261 Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her opinion represents the narrowest majority
holding and lower courts view themselves bound by her opinion. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Denver,
170 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding ban on leafleting in walkway leading to public
theaters based on O'Connor's approach).
262 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
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terfere with the purpose for which the forum was established.63 Al-
though a majority opinion in the Supreme Court has never required
"strict incompatibility,"2 64 under a fact specific analysis, the Supreme
Court opinions held restrictions to be reasonable only when the pro-
posed speech presents a risk of disrupting the relevant forum.265
In her concurrence in Lee, O'Connor proposed that, at a mini-
mum, the government must articulate a reason as to why the bur-
dened speech is inconsistent with the purpose of the forum. Before
the forum analysis was concretized, the Court noted that, "the crucial
question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompati-
ble with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time. 267
Lower court opinions differ on the analytic approach that should
be used to determine what is reasonable. Some lower courts require
a determination that the proposed conduct would "'actually inter-
fere' with the forum's stated purposes, 268 in order to uphold a restric-
tion on speech as reasonable. Others understand Justice
263 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 811 (1990) (holding a ban on the solicitation
on postal sidewalks to be reasonable).
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808-09 ("[A] finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of
the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not
mandated ... [e]ven if some incompatibility with general expressive activity were re-
quired .... ).
265 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 685 (noting that face-to-face solicitation in an airport "would
prove quite disruptive"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 52
(1983) (noting that the policy of limiting access to a school district's internal mail system to
bargaining union prevents the schools "from becoming a battlefield for inter-union squab-
bles").
266 Lee, 505 U.S. at 692.
267 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (upholding a law that prohibited
picketing or demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of school building during certain
hours). justice Kennedy would use the incompatibility test to determine whether an area con-
stitutes a public forum. Lee, 505 U.S. at 701 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
26 United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. S.W. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d
341, 358 (6th Cir. 1998).
269 In United Food & Commercial Workers Union, the Sixth Circuit held that although the transit
authority's policy of excluding controversial bus advertisements was reasonable, its application
of the policy to a particular union bus advertisement was not reasonable. Id. at 357. Since
SORTA ran pro-union ads without any detriment to SORTA's interests, it was not permitted to
claim that those messages were incompatible with the purpose of the forum. Id. See also
Jacobsen v. Rapid City, 128 F.3d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to uphold a ban on news-
racks in an airport because there is "no evidence that placing... newsracks in public portions
of the terminal will interfere with the Airport's principal intended use," but upholding the ban
because it interfered with the city's ability to collect revenue); Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Dep't
of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 1995) (ascertaining that the reasonableness
of a restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum requires "a determination of whether the pro-
posed conduct would 'actually interfere' with the forum's stated purposes"); Multimedia Publ'g
v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that determining
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O'Connor's approach in Lee to promote a balancing approach. The
Seventh and Tenth circuits acknowledged that her approach "blurs
the line between the public and nonpublic forum, suggesting a slid-
ing-scale approach-a standard versus a rule or categories-in which
the benefits and costs of free speech are balanced in particular set-
tings."27 Thus, in Hawkins v. Denver the Tenth Circuit upheld a ban
on leafleting in a Galleria (an entrance way to public theaters held to
be a nonpublic forum) by looking at the nature of public expression
and the "extent to which it interferes with the designated purposes of
the Galleria, given the Galleria's physical attributes."7 '
Circuit and district courts have also required more than mere ra-
tional basis review by upholding a restriction only when "there is evi-
dence in the record to support a determination that the restriction is
reasonable." '72  The Ninth Circuit explicitly noted that the reason-
ableness requirement for restrictions on speech in a "nonpublic fo-
rum requires more of a showing than does the traditional rational ba-
sis test .... [t]here must be evidence that the restriction reasonably
fulfills a legitimate need." '
the reasonableness of a complete ban on newsracks requires an assessment of whether they
would "actually interfere" with the carrying out of the government's purposes); but see Sefick v.
Gardner, 990 F. Supp. 587, 597 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (upholding the regulation even though the dis-
trict did not articulate why the regulation is incompatible with the forum).
270 Chi. Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir. 1998). See also
Hawkins v. Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding ban on leafleting in
walkway leading to public theaters). Some cases do not explicitly state that interference or in-
compatibility is necessary in order to uphold a restriction, but they use lack of incompatibility as
a factor in upholding or invalidating a regulation. See, e.g., Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1067 (2000) ("[Tlhe
district's concerns regarding disruption and potential controversy are legitimate reasons for
restricting the content of the ads, given the purpose of the forum and the surrounding circum-
stances.... ."); Daily v. N.Y. City Housing Auth., 221 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (not-
ing that opening the community center to a "multitude of groups," proffered justification for
exclusion, and would not interfere with the educational and other community purposes); PETA
v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that one of the surrounding cir-
cumstances that courts look at is "the extent to which the excluded expressive activity is incom-
patible with the uses of the property or would interfere with the government's forum objec-
tives"); Mehdi v. United States Postal Serv., 988 F. Supp. 721, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding
restriction on postal service display because "opening up post offices to seasonal displays by the
public would interfere with the Postal Service's own use of decoration to further its business").
271 Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1290.
272 Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 967 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Volokh,
supra note 91, at 654 (noting that the reasonableness standard is a bit more demanding than
rational basis review, but not much).
273 Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 967-68. The court rejected the government's justification for a
ban on clothing with an affiliation to biker organizations because "there is no evidence in the
record supporting a conclusion that clothing indicating affiliation with biker organizations is
particularly likely to be disruptive." Id. at 968. See alsojacobsen v. Rapid City, 128 F.3d 660, 663
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There is also confusion on the role alternative avenues of com-
munication play in deciding the reasonableness of a regulation. Al-
though the availability of alternative means has never become a for-
mal part of the test for a nonpublic forum as articulated by the
Supreme Court, it repeatedly supported its finding that a restriction
was reasonable in a nonpublic forum because the speaker had alter-
native means of communication available."4 Some lower courts con-
tinue to look at the availability of alternative means in determining
whether a restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum is reasonable.2
Thus, according to some courts, one must look at the nature of the
speech, the degree of interference with the purpose of the forum,
and the alternative means available. 6  There are few, if any, cases
that strike down a statute in a nonpublic forum based solely on the
lack of alternative modes of communication.
Despite ambiguities regarding what reasonableness entails, a re-
striction on an eruv is likely to fail. Under a meaningful rational basis
review, disallowing an eruv is likely to be invalidated because there
could be no evidence in the record to support a determination that
the restriction is reasonable. 7  In Tenafly, the city would have diffi-
culty claiming its asserted justifications in maintaining control over
city property and avoiding visual blight when it allowed, under the
(8th Cir. 1997) (invalidating the government's justification because it was "supported only by
vague hearsay testimony"); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion City Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287,
1299 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a rule prohibiting displays in municipal building's lobby be-
cause "[t] he District Court found a number of reasonable justifications for the New Rule 13 and
all are well within the bounds of what rational basis scrutiny permits"); Multimedia Publ'g Co. v.
Greenville Spartanburg Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t isn't enough simply to
establish that the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective."). The
district court, however considered the fact that there was evidence in the record to support the
city's justifications. Grossbaum, 909 F. Supp. 1187, 1205-06 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
274 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992) ("[I]t would be
odd to conclude that the Port Authority's terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the Port
Authority having otherwise assured access ... ."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) ("[T]he speakers have access to alternative channels, in-
cluding direct mail and in person solicitation outside the workplace."); City Council of L.A. v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (holding key that there were numerous other
methods of communication); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 53-
54 (1983) (noting alternative methods of communication); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839
(1976) (rejecting free speech challenge to law banning political solicitation on an army base
because servicemen are free to attend political rallies off base); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827-28 (1974) (holding that law prohibiting media interview with certain inmates is constitu-
tional because prison inmates may communicate with media by mail and through visitors).
275 See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 845 (6th Cir. 2000);Jacobsen,
128 F.3d at 664; Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159; Cook v. Baca, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D.N.M. 2000);
Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
276 See, e.g.,Jacobsen, 128 F.3d at 664; Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 159.
277 See, e.g., Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 967.
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same ordinance, more obtrusive encroachments."" A city would re-
spond by claiming that in order for a government to legitimately
claim an objective, it need not adopt legislation to comprehensively
address those objectives.Y9 However, when a government allows
speech under a particular regulation, and allows exceptions under
that regulation, the government sends the message that its justifica-
tions for the particular regulation are not sufficient to justify a limita-
tion on the particular activity exempted from the restriction.
Even more importantly, there is no evidence that could demon-
strate that restricting an eruv reasonably fulfills a legitimate need to
maintain control over city property and avoid visual blight. In Tena-
fly, the city allegedly feared that if it granted the request for a particu-
lar religious purpose, then it would be required to do so for others.
2 0
An eruv does not preclude the request of other religions. 8' It also
does not require that other religions be granted access. If a religious
group requests that a Christmas tree, menorah, or other visible ob-
jects be hung, those requests would be subject to the same analysis as
an eruv. It is easy to see how a visual display might cause visual blight,
but an eruv is usually unobtrusive and is consequently dissimilar from
almost any other request.
Lastly, the Borough failed to offer any evidence that its concern of
other groups seeking access was a legitimate one. Although, "the
Government need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to
a nonpublic forum, 2 2 eruvs exist in hundreds of communities across
North America. If an eruv negatively impacted a city's ability to main-
tain control over its property, Tenafly might have offered an example
from another community in which an eruv exists and has created
problems for maintenance of city property. Instead, the comparisons
drawn focused on the negative impact an eruv had on a community
because of the influx of Orthodox Jews. It is hard to imagine an
See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167 (3d Cir. 2002).
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 760-61 (1990) (holding that a ban on solicitation
on postal sidewalks was not unreasonable even though other forms of potentially equally disrup-
tive speech were not prohibited).
280 Arthur Peck Aff. 2, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142
(D.N.J. 2001) (No. 00-6051).
28 If a religion claimed that in order to do a certain ritual, there could not exist any, even
figuratively enclosed area, then the requests of the two religions would be mutually exclusive.
282 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 810 (1985) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 (1982)).
283 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 155 F. Supp. at 166 (discussing community members' problems with
an eruv). Councilman Sullivan made inquires into Palo Alto, which has no eruv, and San Diego,
but he did not ask any of the communities in New Jersey that have had an eruv for numerous
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eruv would wreak havoc in Tenafly, where it has not done so in other
communities across the country.
Avoidance of controversy could provide ajustification under some
circumstances, and the lawsuit in Tenafly clearly sparked a contro-
versy. A meaningful rational basis review would reveal that the con-
troversy was sparked by community prejudices, rendering controversy
an illegitimate reason for restricting activity.284 Furthermore, there is
no evidence to suggest that an eruv would disrupt the purpose of the
forum.285
A city might claim threatened court costs as a "reasonable" reason
for restricting speech in a nonpublic forum, and if a group threatens
to sue, there will be evidence to demonstrate that an eruv will increase
costs. Since an eruv association could indemnify the group, this rea-
son cannot bar an eruv.2 86
Since an eruv does not actually interfere with the purpose or use
of the forum, and is not incompatible with the purpose of the forum,
even when the government defines the purpose, it would fail under
an approach, which requires interference with the purpose or use of
years. None of the other council-members made any inquiries into the effect of an eruv on a
community that has an eruv. Pl.'s Reply Mem. of Law at 10, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n (No. 00-6051).
284 Avoiding controversy that would disrupt the workplace is a legitimate reason for restrict-
ing speech in a nonpublic forum. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811. The Court never held that a
government can restrict speech in order to avoid controversy that has no adverse impact on the
forum at issue. Understanding Cornelius to sanction a governmental interest in avoiding any
type of controversy contradicts a "bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment," namely
that the "government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). In fact,
the principle function of the First Amendment is to invite dispute. See id. Since the alleged
message conveyed by an eruv cannot be displayed in any other fashion, a rule permitting the
avoidance of controversy at large would contradict this basic principle by completely banning
an eruv simply because some members of society find the idea offensive.
285 In Cornelius, the government sought to exclude political groups from its charity campaign,
the relevant forum, for federal employees. Campaign workers noted that "extra effort was re-
quired to persuade disgruntled employees to contribute" and some "areas reported significant
declines in the amount of contributions." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 810. Thus, the controversy sur-
rounding the inclusion of the political groups directly impeded the purpose of the forum, to
raise money for charity, and there was evidence in the record that the controversy had that ef-
fect. In Diloreto v. Downey Unified School District Board of Education, the Ninth Circuit intimated
that controversy was a legitimate justification for denying a group access to advertising space on
a baseball field fence. 196 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the government's stated
purpose was concern over "disruption" as a result of the potential controversy. Id.
286 The Ninth Circuit held that preventing expensive litigation was reasonable when potential
court costs would directly interfere with the purpose of the forum. Diloreto, 196 F.3d at 968. If
court costs are viewed as a reasonable justification for restricting speech in a public forum, then
the relevant question should be whether the imposition of court costs interferes with the pur-
pose of the forum. Utility poles facilitate telecommunication, and were not created as a fund-
raiser.
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the forum. The ultimate purpose of the forum is to facilitate safe and
efficient telecommunication. The eruv is safe, unobtrusive, and has
no negative impact on telecommunication. Additionally, because of
its uniqueness, it does not require that the government open its fo-
rum to other speakers who might disrupt the forum.
2 87
When the government opens the forums to groups, outside of the
main purpose of the forum, Justice O'Connor asks whether the re-
stricted activity is incompatible with the "multipurpose forum" at is-
sue. 8 Even though the purpose of utility poles is to facilitate tele-
communication, if the government has allowed access to its poles, it
has created a multipurpose forum, allowing others to express mes-
sages. The question would be whether allowing an eruv is incompati-
ble with this multipurpose environment. Since it is clearly not, re-
strictions would fail.
Under a balancing approach, a restriction on an eruv similarly
would be unlikely to survive. The balancing approach looks at the
competing interests. It looks at the extent to which the speech would
interfere with governmental activity and the speech interest involved.
Since an eruv does not interfere with the use or purpose of the forum,
and the government's interests are extremely weak, there are few fac-
tors counting in the government's favor. Additionally, the unavail-
ability of alternative means strengthens the plaintiffs interests.2 9 In
the context of an eruv, there are no alternative means.
287 1 have defined this approach as requiring interference with the purpose of the forum, in
light of the wording of some lower courts, but there is confusion as to what is required by an
incompatibility or interference approach. Grayned called on courts to look at the "normal activ-
ity of the property," which implies that courts look at the uses of the property. Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Another version of the incompatibility test could con-
sider only the primary use of the property. Justice Kennedy proposed that courts look at the
uses of the forum and would require that the government, rather than the plaintiff, bear the
burden of proving that the speech is incompatible with the purpose of the forum. Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695-704 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (us-
ing incompatibility to determine if a forum is a public forum). Justice O'Connor's wording
similarly suggests that the relevant inquiry is the "intended function" of the forum. Id. at 691
(O'Connor, J., concurring). If the relevant inquiry focuses on the governmental purposes for
the forum, rather than use of the forum alone, there is also a question as to whether all of the
stated interests may be considered. A city could state that in addition to facilitating telecom-
munication, it has an additional purpose of not decreasing funds. If secondary purposes are
considered, then some inquiry into the government's justifications is appropriate, requiring
evidence that the secondary purpose will be furthered by application of its policy. See, e.g.,
United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. S.W. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 358
(6th Cir. 1998).
288 Lee, 505 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
289 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Rapid City, 128 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 1997); Multimedia Publ'g v.
Greenville-Spautauburg Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1993).
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After analyzing the reasonableness standard, it is now possible to
understand why the free speech claim is more likely to succeed with
regard to a geographical enclosure even when it involves the use of
public property. Although free exercise might occasionally receive
strict scrutiny, while a free speech claim would only need to be rea-
sonable,90 this would have little effect on the ultimate outcome. In
free speech jurisprudence, the default is the reasonableness standard,
which demands more than traditional rational basis review. In con-
trast, the default is minimal or no scrutiny under Smith, rendering a
plaintiff unlikely to succeed, unless heightened scrutiny is applied.
B. Potential Ways To Bridge the Supreme Court Gaps
This next section focuses on potential ways to bridge the gap be-
tween Smith and Lukumi in light of free speech jurisprudence. I ar-
gue that minimal review for laws that are not substantially underin-
clusive is not a viable approach. Then I discuss strengths and
weaknesses of alternative approaches.
Before discussing potential solutions, it is important to keep in
mind two competing ideas regarding the purpose of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. In Smith, the majority adopted the view that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause mandates only formal equality.29' Thus, the analysis in
Smith and Lukumi is designed to determine when a law targets relig-
ion.92 A competing view recognizes that because religious groups are
not similarly situated with regard to their religious obligations, laws
that correspond to the majority's needs do not respect the needs of
minority groups. Therefore, substantive equality, which considers
differences among groups, is preferable. 3
290 This would be true if, under a broad interpretation of the Sherbert exception, a law receives
strict scrutiny. Under the Free Speech Clause, such a law would still be subject to the reason-
ableness standard.
2 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that the disadvantaging of
minority religions is an "unavoidable consequence" of democratic government).
22 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35
(1992).
23 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (adopting this view). See also Brown-
stein, supra note 33, at 840; Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, Mediating Institutions: Be-
yond the Public/Private Distinction: The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protect-
ing Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1285 (1994) (arguing that states must treat
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious groups with the same regard as that enjoyed
by concerns of citizens generally).
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1. Generally Applicable Unless Substantially Underinclusive
Looking carefully at cases involving an eruv demonstrates the
problems in applying strict scrutiny only to laws that are substantially
underinclusive, but no or minimal scrutiny to all other laws. Given
both that the reasonableness standard appears to be more exacting
than rational basis review" and that for a law not to be generally ap-
plicable, it must be substantially underinclusive-a large inconsis-
tency between free speech and free exercise results. Where, for ex-
ample, a land use ordinance bans all uses of governmental property
and has denied all requests for use, except the use of orange ribbons,
applying a reasonableness analysis would lead to invalidation, while
applying rational basis review or no review would not."'45
As I mentioned, there are several reasons why this inconsistency
matters. From a practical perspective, affording more protection to
free speech than free exercise encourages litigants to define religious
exercise as speech, increasing the complexity of litigation. Moreover,
interpreting Smith and Lukumi narrowly, according free exercise less
protection than free speech, strips religious exercise of its status as a
fundamental right.29 6 Under such a view, religion is protected only
insofar as it can be protected under the Free Speech and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses, rendering the Free Exercise Clause nearly redun-
dant.
29
1
Most importantly, in Smith and Lukumi, the Court adopted a re-
quirement of formal, rather than substantive equality. However, by
exempting a large category of laws from any form of meaningful scru-
tiny, the Smith-Lukumi framework, interpreted this way, fails to effec-
tuate even formal equality. Allowing a governmental body to hide
behind hypothetical reasons strips courts of a potentially useful tool
to determine the ultimate inquiry clearly set forth in Lukumi: whether
"the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or
regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious
294 The Supreme Court itself appears to understand the reasonableness analysis to be more
exacting than traditional rational basis review. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 685-93 (1992) (O'ConnorJ., concurring). In the aftermath of Lee, most lower courts
seem to understand the reasonableness test as some form of less deferential scrutiny than mere
rational basis review. See infra Part III.B.4.
295 See supra Part II.C.4.
296 See Gedicks, supra note 232, at 927-28.
297 Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause, How Redundant and Why?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95,
115 (2001) (arguing that although not entirely redundant, the Free Exercise Clause has limited
doctrinal significance); Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71,
72 (2001) (arguing that contemporary constitutional doctrine may render the Free Exercise
Clause redundant).
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reasons. ' 298 In Lukumi, the Court noted that the Free Exercise Clause
protects against governmental hostility which is "masked as well as
overt.",2 99 Therefore, historical background, legislative or administra-
tive history, and the effect of a law in operation are simply forms of
evidence to determine whether a law targets religion. Courts
should not foreclose a useful tool for disclosing when a law targets re-
ligion by barring meaningful review in cases not nearly as extreme as
Lukumi.
Both the need for, and efficacy of looking into governmental rea-
sons is especially true in the context of an eruv since discrimination
within city councils "lurks behind.., vague and universally applicable
reasons. ' '3° This need is particularly important where a law is new or
is not widely used. Suppose only two groups applied for access to util-
ity poles prior to the request for an eruv. One proposed use, more
obtrusive than an eruv, was denied. Another minimally obtrusive re-
quest was granted. Under a narrow reading of Lukumi, the law does
not target religion because it has been invoked to disallow fifty per-
cent of those who have requested access. However, the fact that the
law does not target religion does not mean that the ordinance's ap-
plication to an eruv was not discriminatory.
In Lukumi, the Court noted that its equal protection cases provide
guidance in determining whether a law is neutral.0 2 Equal Protection
doctrine allows a court to determine a city's objective from both di-
rect and circumstantial evidence. Some type of analysis, involving
at a minimum an inquiry into the government's justifications, can re-
veal circumstantial evidence of discrimination. In Cleburne Living Cen-
ter, the Court looked at the city's reasons and concluded that the de-
nial was based on an "irrational prejudice. '0 4 Even if other groups
are subject to a law, looking into the reasons for a given ordinance
might disclose that an ordinance's application is similarly based on
an "irrational prejudice," and thus, the law may discriminate against
religion. As discussed earlier, on its surface, opposing an eruv be-
cause of constituents' concerns appears legitimate. Without further
scrutiny, this might succeed. In reality, Councilman Sullivan's state-
ment that he based his decision on his constituents' concerns is tan-
tamount to saying that he based his decisions on the negative atti-
29 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
MJ Id. at 534.
300 Id. at 540.
301 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000).
= Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
303 Id.
304 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
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tudes and unsubstantiated fear of community members, an action the
Supreme Court expressly condemned. In short, applying no review
or traditional rational basis review blocks off an avenue of uncovering
circumstantial evidence of when a law targets religion.
2. Any Underinclusion is Evidence of Discrimination
The underinclusive analysis employed by the Third Circuit to
minimize the gap between Smith and Lukumi is a viable alternative.
Although the approach suggested in the Third Circuit is described as
two steps, in most cases, both steps collapse into one. First, there is
the analysis for general applicability. As employed, a court looks at
whether the religious use undermines the purpose of the ordinance
any more than secular exemptions to the ordinance. If it does not, a
heightened level of scrutiny applies. If the secular exemptions simi-
larly undermine the purpose of the ordinance, the existence of those
exemptions will likely impugn the government's interest, and the or-
dinance is likely to fail.
In Lukumi, the Court noted that there are "many ways of demon-
strating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of relig-
ion or religious conduct.""°' Thus, both the legislative history and
substantial underinclusiveness of the ordinance constituted "strong
evidence 30 6 that the law's object was to suppress religious conduct.
Similarly, underinclusiveness, even when not substantial, can be used
as evidence of discrimination.
The former Tenafly Borough attorney, Walter Lesnevich, criti-
cized the approach adopted by the Third Circuit. He commented
that the Third Circuit's decision "is very difficult for municipal law all
over New Jersey. It says if you don't enforce an ordinance 100 per-
cent, you can never enforce it against a religious group. 3 7 First, he
misstated the rule. A municipality would be permitted to enforce an
ordinance against a religious group if the religious group's proposed
use undermined the purpose of the ordinance more than allowed
uses.
Although this approach does place a burden on municipalities to
uniformly enforce its ordinances or suffer the consequences, such a
burden is not new to constitutional analysis of discrimination. Equal
305 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
306 See id. at 535 ("Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evi-
dence of its object.").
07 Charles Toutant, Removal of 'Eruv' Markings May Violate Religious Freedom, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 29, 2002, at 3.
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protection doctrine requires that similarly situated people be treated
similarly. The underinclusiveness approach propounded above
demands no more.
The more difficult question that arises under this approach is not
whether the government should be required to enforce its ordinance
against similar uses, but as a factual matter determining when a gov-
ernment has in fact failed to do so. The district court in Tenafly
noted that "the Court lack[ed] sufficient information to conclude
that (1) the Borough was aware the ribbons existed, and (2) that the
Borough at least tacitly approved of their private maintenance in the
right-of-way. 3 0 9 If the underinclusive analysis is to be used in all cases,
then what constitutes incomplete enforcement should be limited.
Without proof that government officials knew, or at least reasonably
should have known of allowed uses, incomplete enforcement cannot
be deemed evidence of discrimination. Thus, if the borough truly
did not know about the orange ribbons, orange ribbons cannot be
deemed as evidence of selective enforcement.
Similarly, it would not be fair to infer that a municipality selec-
tively enforced an ordinance from individual actions of non-policy
making officers. Suppose the government requires photo identifica-
tion in all governmental buildings in a certain city and five hundred
security guards work at different shifts at the various entrances to the
governmental buildings. According to the reasoning in Lesnevich's
complaint, if one of these security guards exempts people because
they need to use a restroom,10 then the government should not be
entitled to enforce the regulation against religious observers who
claim that it is against their religion to be photographed." ' Once it is
established that the religious reason did not undermine the govern-
ment's purpose any more than the exempted reason, the next ques-
tion would be whether the government was aware of the exemptions,
and if so, what it did to stop them. If the government is willing to al-
s08 SeeJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1974) (noting that under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike") (quoting Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); cf. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962-63
(1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause allows the States considerable leeway to enact legislation
that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently.").
3W Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 177 (D.N.J. 2001); but see
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167 n.28 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is
ample evidence in the record showing that orange ribbons were attached to the Borough's util-
ity poles for a 'lengthy period of time' and that Borough officials knew about them but made no
effort to remove them.").
0 chose this reason because it would stand in the same relationship to the government's
ultimate interest in security as would a request for a religious exemption.
311 See Toutant, supra note 307.
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low a guard to continually relax the requirement to allow people to
use the restroom, it cannot claim that it has a serious security interest
in not relaxing its identification requirement for religious reasons,
and therefore, applying the selective enforcement analysis would not
place too harsh a burden on the government. In contrast, if the gov-
ernment repeatedly indicated that exceptions were not permitted,
even if an individual guard made an exception, the governmental en-
tity in control should not be deemed to have selectively enforced an
ordinance.
The suggestion that liability could be imposed because of every
exemption also belies the ultimate purpose of the underinclusive
analysis. Ultimately, the question is whether the failure to uniformly
enforce a law shows discrimination. The inquiry of incomplete en-
forcement in Tenafly operated as strong evidence of discrimination
because the decision to allow or disallow uses of governmental prop-
erty was made by a centralized governmental body, which the Third
Circuit concluded tacitly approved of other uses."2
In short, selective enforcement (however substantial or insubstan-
tial), legislative text, and legislative history could be used as evidence
of discrimination. Given the difficulty in proving discrimination, one
form of an underinclusion analysis argues that a plaintiff should be
entitled to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, allowing an in-
ference of discrimination from a borough's selective enforcement.
The defendant should be entitled to rebut this evidence by proving
that its actions were somehow not discriminatory. Ultimately, how-
ever, the question for the fact-finder would always remain whether
the object of the law was to suppress religion"' Since it is difficult to
establish discrimination by governmental bodies, using selective en-
forcement as evidence of discrimination could be a powerful tool to
eradicate any type of decision-making that would devalue religious
justifications.
One advantage of using underinclusion or selective enforcement
as evidence of discrimination is that it has the potential to protect re-
.112 Tenafly, 309 F.3d 167 n.28 (noting that the Borough officials knew of other uses).
313 This approach is similar to the approach used to analyze employment discrimination cases
under Title VII. In that context, employees in a protected class are entitled to make out a
prima facie case by showing that they were treated differently from members of an unprotected
class because of their memberships in the protected class. This circumstantial evidence leads to
an inference of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the employer to articu-
late a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. If the employer articulates a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the de-
fendant's proffered reason was pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802-03 (1973).
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ligion from any form of discriminatory treatment, and thus, ensures
formal equality. 14 Another advantage is that it fits within the existing
framework of Smith and Lukumi, both doctrinally and theoretically. It
would also offer a solution to free exercise doctrine that arises not
simply in the context of using governmental property in a limited
public or nonpublic forum as the reasonableness analysis is designed
to do, but would provide a rule for analyzing all free exercise cases.
One difficulty that arises, in addition to the detailed factual in-
quiry on when a law is selectively enforced, is that the test for free ex-
ercise would be sufficiently different to once again encourage liti-
gants to classify religious exercise as speech. In particular, the
consideration of alternative means in the speech context would pro-
vide incentives for religious claimants to resort to free speech.
Lastly, it protects only formal equality. Therefore, even if a large
burden falls disproportionately on a particular religious group, as
long as a law was not meant to target religion and was not selectively
enforced, it would be valid. Given religious differences, formal equal-
ity "virtually insures disparity of treatment since people of different
interests will be treated the same.0 15 Thus, a law that mandates pub-
lic school attendance on Saturday for a legitimate reason is facially
neutral and may satisfy the formal equality demanded by both read-
ings of Lukumi discussed above.16
3. Compelling Interest Test
Prior to Smith, laws that placed substantial burdens on sincerely
held religious beliefs were only valid if narrowly tailored to a compel-
ling governmental interest.31 7  Some Justices would have used the
compelling interest test in Smith. 8 Members of Congress also tried to
institute a compelling interest test through the Religious Freedom
314 If the government is allowed to define its purposes broadly, and there is no scrutiny of
governmental objectives, then even this approach may not protect religious liberty because a
law could arguably not be underinclusive with respect to the government's broader objectives.
315 Brownstein, supra note 33, at 840.
316 Professors Eisgruber and Sager propose that religion be treated with equal regard. One
factor courts should consider is whether a law would have been enacted if the majority shared
the minority's religious belief or whether the religious claimant would have been exempted had
the minority's belief been shared by the majority. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 293, at
1285. Applied to an eruv, the principle of equal regard would demand an analysis of how law-
makers would have acted had the majority shared the belief that carrying on the Sabbath was
prohibited.
117 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1943) (arguing that government's need
for public safety must be greater than religious rights at issue).
318 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
May 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Restoration Act."9 Most recently, RLUIPA instituted a test similar to
the compelling interest test of Sherbert v. Verner.30 RLUIPA prohibited
the government from placing a "substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person ... unless ... it is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest."21 Many states have
also enacted state RFRA's with a similar compelling interest test.
In contrast to the test set forth in Smith-Lukumi, the compelling in-
terest test recognizes the requirement of substantive equality. In Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith, she stated that "[t]he compel-
ling interest test effectuates the First Amendment's command that
religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred
position."3 2 A nondiscrimination principle reflects the same values as
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supreme Court has "recognized
that the Free Exercise Clause protects values distinct from those pro-
tected by the Equal Protection Clause."
323
This compelling interest test as stated above is problematic for
several reasons. First, courts are not qualified to inquire into the cen-
trality of a religious practice or into the substantiality of the burden.
In rejecting the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court noted:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of reli-
gious beliefs before applying a "compelling interest" test in the free exer-
cise field, than it would be for them to determine the "importance" of
ideas before applying the "compelling interest" test in the free speech
field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict
a believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal
faith?. 4
The inability of courts to evaluate the substantiality of a religious
burden on religious groups leads to what is most problematic about
the compelling interest test approach. Since courts can simply de-
termine that a law does not place a substantial burden on religious
practice, the compelling interest test did not always live up to its
promise of protecting religion.2 In the case of zoning ordinances,
for example, some courts found that zoning restrictions placed no
319 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
320 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
321 Id.
322 Smith, 494 U.S. at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
323 Id. at 901.
324 Id. at 887.
325 See Robert W. Tuttle, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 861, 871 (2000) ("Despite the robust lan-
guage of Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder, the compelling interest test never lived up to its promise
in the zoning context.").
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burden on the religious community, and then applied traditional ra-
tional basis review to the zoning ordinance.2 6
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted
that a substantial burden requirement "would make petty harassment
of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of
the First Amendment.0 27 The danger of imposing a substantial bur-
den requirement is clear from a case involving an eruv. The Borough
of Tenafly argued that denying permission for an eruv did not place a
substantial burden on Orthodox Jews. If a court determined that
absence of an eruv did not substantially burden religious practice, a
city would be free to deny Orthodox Jews access to its poles (under
the Free Exercise Clause), even if it permitted numerous other
groups to use them. Thus, imposing a substantial burden threshold
before conducting any type of meaningful review allows discrimina-
tion, as long as the discrimination does not impose a substantial bur-
den.
Lastly, the compelling interest test might minimize protection for
religious groups because of Establishment Clause concerns. Since
preferring religious speech over nonreligious speech constitutes a
violation of the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause,
the compelling interest test could never give protection to religious
activity that constitutes speech if this standard is truly more exacting
than the one applied in the free speech context. A government
would always have a compelling interest in complying with the free
speech or Establishment Clause for not granting an exemption for
religious institutions.2 9 In short, the compelling interest test can be
reduced to the following: Laws that, in the mind of those not familiar
with the religious practice, place a substantial burden on religious
practice, which is not also speech, must be justified by a compelling
interest. All other religious exercise claims would receive merely ra-
tional basis review and would be likely to fail. Thus, the compelling
interest fails to provide formal equality to cases where there is dis-
crimination, but no substantial burden, but provides substantive
326 Id.
327 Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994).
328 Br. for Appellees at 65, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir.
2002) (No. 01-3301).
32 See Brownstein, supra note 111, at 627 ("RFRA cannot provide special protection to mate-
rial because of its religious content; to do so would violate the Establishment Clause and dis-
criminates based on the content of the material (violating the Free Speech Clause)."); Volokh,
supra note 91, at 614-15 (discussing how one distinguishes speech from non-speech in this con-
text).
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equality to a small class of cases that meet the substantial burden re-
quirement.
4. Reasonableness Tests from Free Speech Analogue
Until now I have discussed three approaches: one that recognizes
that a law is not generally applicable only when it is substantially un-
derinclusive, one that deems a law not generally applicable when its
enforcement is underinclusive, and one that requires that a substan-
tial burden be justified by a compelling interest. The first two fit
within the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the last has its root in
the Supreme Court's pre-Smith cases. This next section will discuss
how the different interpretations of the reasonableness standard used
in free speech doctrine (with regard to a limited or nonpublic fo-
rum) would work in the free exercise context.
Mandating inquiry into the government's purported justifications,
as some lower courts have done to determine reasonableness in the
free speech context and the Supreme Court did in Cleburne Living
Center in the equal protection context; would better serve the func-
tion of providing formal equality. It would prevent more discrimina-
tion by not allowing governments to hide behind universally applica-
ble reasons when those reasons do not clearly fulfill a legitimate
governmental need. It also does not thwart a government's ability to
fulfill its goals. If a governmental body cannot point to at least some
evidence that a regulation or its application of a regulation serves a
legitimate need, then it can hardly claim an interest in enforcing a
regulation. Thus, the standard gives government flexibility to en-
force ordinances, while providing a court with another way to reach
its ultimate goal of determining when in fact discrimination has oc-
curred.
If the Court maintains the basic principle of Smith, some form of
meaningful rational basis review must replace the default minimal
scrutiny for laws that are deemed neutral or generally applicable if
religious exercise is to receive any protection. However, abandoning
Smith and using meaningful rational basis review is not sufficient.
In order to fully minimize the inconsistency in both analysis and
result, between free speech and free exercise cases, there would need
to be two standards for free exercise claims. The meaningful rational
basis review would govern free exercise claims that arise involving the
use of governmental property that would be deemed a nonpublic or
'4s0 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 472 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
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limited public forum, and a stricter standard would govern free exer-
cise claims that implicate laws concerning the use of private property
and governmental property traditionally open to the public. The dif-
ferent standards would be necessary because a law burdening inci-
dental restrictions on speech on private property or in a public forum
would need to be: "(1) narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and (2) leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. Since the latter standard, and in particular, the
alternative means requirement, would result in more frequent invali-
dation than merely requiring evidence of a legitimate justification,
religious exercise claimants would still have a better claim under the
Free Speech Clause when challenging a law in a public forum or on
private property. If two standards were used, however, a free exercise
claim that involved the use of public property would import the
widely criticized and blurry lines of the forum analysis into free exer-
cise jurisprudence.
331 Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1991). See also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (using the standard quoted above to
uphold regulation on volume of amplified music in an area of New York's Central Park); Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (using this standard to uphold
ban on sleeping in certain areas of public park).
3s2 Members of the Court have criticized the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 694 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The
Court's public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values underlying .... the
First Amendment."); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that public forum analysis obfuscates rather than clarifies issues at hand); Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 815 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing):
The Court's analysis transforms the First Amendment into a mere ban on viewpoint cen-
sorship, ignores the principles underlying the public forum doctrine, flies in the face of
the decisions in which the Court has identified property as a limited public forum, and
empties the limited public forum concept of all its meaning.
Scholars have also criticized the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., David S. Day, TheEnd of the Pub-
lic Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 186 (1992); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public
Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110-11 (1986) (arguing
in favor of a balancing approach, instead of rigid categories); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public
Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1557 (1998) (discussing confusion
created by doctrine); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310 (1999) ("The Court's doctrine is crude, historically ossified, and seem-
ingly unconnected to any thematic view of the free expression guarantee"); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987) (discussing different approaches); Ed-
ward J. Neveril, Comment, "Objective" Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment
at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (1996) (arguing against cate-
gorical approach); David A. Stoll, Comment, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, In-
juring Nine: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1271,
1313-14 (1992) ("[T]he doctrine has reached such a point of disarray that it fails to offer guid-
ance.").
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Additionally, this type of review might be too deferential. "3 Using
the same analysis for free speech and free exercise claims would be
useful to minimize incentives to define religious exercise as speech.
However, in many cases the restriction on religious exercise would be
more severe than an incidental restriction on free speech. Disallow-
ing an eruv prevents some Orthodox Jews from leaving their houses
on the Sabbath. Similarly, a person who feels a religious duty not to
let photographs be taken would be completely barred from entering
a governmental building that required photo identification.334 In
contrast, bans on newspaper stands, solicitation and governmental
displays in a particular area do not pose similarly substantial burdens
primarily because of the availability of alternative means. Therefore,
a more scrutinizing approach to incidental burdens on free exercise
may be necessary.
Tenafly Eruv Association, therefore, is perhaps not a good test case
for meaningful rational basis review because there is no evidence that
disallowing plastic strips on utility poles actually furthers any legiti-
mate governmental interest.3 Yet, there are some cases where look-
ing into the legitimacy of the government's justification would not
uncover covert discrimination because the law is formally neutral; yet,
the burden placed on the individual is sufficiently large that perhaps
a standard that demands substantive equality, given religious differ-
ences, is more appropriate.
The incompatibility test, also employed to determine reasonable-
ness, may also not be sufficient alone to protect religious exercise.
Some noted that the incompatibility test did not protect free speech
because "it depends on the government's own definition of the
proper uses of a forum and provides no mechanism for judicial scru-
tiny of the government's choices. 3 6 Professor Steven Gey calls it a
hopeless task to prove that speech is not incompatible with the pur-
133 SeeVolokh, supra note 91, at 656.
334 See id. at 657 (discussing the photograph example).
335 Professor Volokh proposes the following test case for some sort of meaningful rational
basis review: an orthodox Jew challenges the placement of an electric gate at a public housing
facility because OrthodoxJews cannot activate an electric gate on the Sabbath. There are many
legitimate reasons for wanting an electric gate that do not implicate discrimination. There
might also be legitimate reasons for not accommodating Orthodox Jews. The city might fear
that it will compromise security if it gives Orthodox Jews a key to a secret back door or there
may not be room to have both an electric and non-electric door. Yet, since other people are
allowed access to the public building, and only Orthodox Jews are excluded, perhaps a higher
standard of scrutiny would be desirable. See id. at 656-57.
336 Gey, supra note 332, at 1561.
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pose of the forum, as described by the government.37  In cases like
Tenafly Eruv Association, there is no conceivable way that replacing
one set of plastic strips with another can be held to be incompatible
with the purpose of the utility poles or with the use of utility poles for
its intended purpose. In the photo identification example, however,
the government would argue that allowing individuals to enter with-
out photo identification compromises its security interests, and is,
therefore, incompatible with the purpose of its forum, to provide safe
governmental services. Aside from its potential for restricting free
speech or free exercise if the government's asserted purposes are
given complete deference, the incompatibility test would also import
the widely criticized forum analysis to free exercise law.
Of the free speech analogues in the reasonableness realm, the
balancing approach appears to be the best option. Applied to the
free exercise context, courts would be required to look at the com-
peting interests of the government and the burdened individual.
This would entail an analysis of the nature of the forum at issue, the
extent to which the proposed use would interfere with the govern-
ment's purposes in restricting religious exercise, and the alternative
means available of religious exercise. 38  As many have noted, the al-
ternative means prong does not have an easy analogue in free exer-
cise jurisprudence.3 9 Alternative means of religious exercise are of-
ten not available3 4 0 but using the alternative means test flexibl as one
factor in an analysis does, not unduly restrict the government.
One advantage of this flexible approach is that it focuses the
court's analysis on factors, which unlike the centrality of a religious
practice, it is qualified to analyze, leading to a potentially more favor-
able result for religious liberty than even the compelling interest test.
However, Professor Gedicks noted that the alternative means test in
337 Id. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 689
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that face to face solicitation is incompatible with the air-
port's functionality). Justice O'Connor's formulation of the ultimate inquiry under the compel-
ling interest test and her formulation of the incompatibility test resemble each other. See Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 905 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he critical
question in this case is whether exempting respondents from the State's general criminal pro-
hibition will unduly interfere with the fulfillment of a governmental interest.").
38 SeeStoll, supra note 332, at 1314 (advocating a balancing approach for the Supreme Court
that requires courts to look at the nature of the forum and the competing governmental and
speech interests simultaneously).
339 See Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1217
(1996); Gedicks, supra note 130, at 92.
340 See Gedicks, supra note 232, at 937.
S41 See Doff, supra note 339, at 1217 (arguing that the alternative means prong should be
used flexibly in a free exercise context).
May 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONS77TUTIONAL LA W
the free exercise context, requires that "a court determine whether
the alternative satisfies the religious obligation that otherwise would
have been met by the burdened practice. This, in turn, would re-
quire the inquiry into the claimant's religious beliefs that was con-
demned by Smith.'' 42 However, in many cases, determining whether
there are alternative means does not entail an analysis of the particu-
lar religion, but of external factors. 43  Furthermore, even when it
does require inquiry into religious practice, the determination may
not be as controversial.14  For example, whether an eruv poses a sub-
stantial burden on a religious practice would be controversial.
Whether there were alternative means of the allegedly burdened
practice would be a simple determination given the uncontroversial
belief that Orthodox Jews may not carry objects on most streets on
Sabbath without an eruv.
If the Court shifts away from the categorical approach in free
speech jurisprudence, then the balancing approach would harmonizefr • 345
free speech and free exercise jurisprudence. If the Court adheres
to its categorical approach in free speech jurisprudence, but adopts
the balancing approach for all free exercise claims, there would be a
discrepancy between the analysis for laws burdening speech in what
would be considered a public forum and laws burdening religion. A
similar problem arises when one considers whether this standard
should be used only in the context of governmental property or
whether it should be applied to all free exercise claims. If it is ap-
plied to all free exercise claims, free speech still is arguably given
more protection than free exercise.
Despite this discrepancy in analysis, there is less likely to be a dis-
crepancy in result because the balancing approach has the potential
for according more protection to free speech than even the compel-
ling interest test. This would be especially true if the balancing test
used meaningful rational basis review and selective enforcement in
342 Gedicks, supra note 232, at 947-48.
343 See id. at 948.
144 Id.
345 Although suggesting a reform of free speech law is beyond the scope of this comment,
justices and scholars have argued in favor of a less categorical approach in free speech jurispru-
dence. See C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analy-
sis, 55 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 110-11 (1986) (arguing in favor of a balancing approach, instead of
rigid categories); David A. Stoll, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, Injuring Nine:
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1271, 1321-22 (1992)
(recommending an objective balancing approach in place of the Court's current public forum
doctrine). See also Chi. Acorn Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 703 (7th Cir. 1998)
(understanding justice O'Connor's approach in Lee to have adopted a standard versus a rule or
categories).
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order to more accurately assess the strength of governmental inter-
ests in its ordinances and application of its ordinances. Evidence
proving the legitimacy of a policy and its application strengthens gov-
ernmental interests. Lack of evidence weakens governmental inter-
ests. Similarly, to the extent that an ordinance is selectively enforced,
it may weaken the government's interests. Lack of alternative means
strengthens the claimant's interests, and availability of alternative
means weakens them.
This approach might be appropriate for all free exercise claims
because it focuses the court's attention on objective factors, thereby
leaving less room for judicial discretion. Yet, it gives the government
the flexibility it needs to pass legislation, without allowing any one
factor to necessarily invalidate a law. Additionally, Establishment
Clause concerns that arise with the compelling interest test will not
result if free speech is treated similarly. Lastly, the alternative means
prong appears to recognize more than a formal equality interest. It
would require a government to recognize that in some cases even
though there is no discrimination, the lack of alternative means re-
quires the government to act differently because the right at issue de-
serves protection, not just from discrimination, but as an independ-
ent right.
5. Summary
Although I have outlined different approaches separately, in prac-
tice, many overlap. An underinclusive analysis is often used in order
to determine the reasonableness of the government's justifications.
InJustice O'Connor's opinion in Lee, she looks at the effect of leaflet-
ing compared to the effect of other activities allowed in the airport. 
46
In the Sixth Circuit, which required interference, the question ulti-
mately became, whether the use sought to be excluded interfered
with the purpose of the forum any more than uses already permitted.347
Similarly, as suggested above, under a balancing approach, some ex-
amination into the government's justifications and selective enforce-
ment would play a significant role in objectifying the analysis.
I outlined the approaches separately to try and isolate the differ-
ent factors and strands that might play a determinative role, but in
fashioning an ultimate solution to the quagmire that currently exists,
346 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 690-92 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
347 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg'I Transit
Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 349-55 (6th Cir. 1998).
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it may be that strands of these approaches should be combined. At
an absolute minimum, however, some type of meaningful rational ba-
sis review into the government's purported justification for the appli-
cation of its ordinance is required as a default in place of minimal or
no scrutiny if the Free Exercise Clause is meant to protect against re-
ligious discrimination.
6. Statutory Considerations
Although a full discussion of the constitutionality and application
of congressional acts protecting religion is beyond the scope of this
article, their application to the immediate case is worth mentioning.
In the aftermath of Boerne v. Flores, striking down the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act as applied to the states, many state legislatures
adopted state RFRA's with similar standards to the compelling inter-
est test of Sherbert v. Verner. Although I addressed some problems with
the substantial burden requirement that often serves as a threshold
for the application of the compelling interest standard, if a state
RFRA existed, an eruv association could claim that its members can-
not attend synagogue without an eruv on the Sabbath, constituting a
substantial burden, and since there is no compelling interest for not
granting permission to erect the geographical structure or to grant
permission for an eruv, a litigant would automatically win. If courts
interpret Lukumi narrowly, then state RFRAs would become the only
way, outside of land use cases, to protect against religious discrimina-
tion claims.
I have also mentioned RLUIPA several times mainly because the
reasons for its enactment are instructive. A claimant seeking to erect
an eruv might be able to sue under RLUIPA. The adoption of the Act
is particularly relevant to an eruv because the Act was adopted in or-
der to counter the discriminatory effects of ad-hoc decision-making
of city councils and boards. A similar type of ad-hoc decision-making
is capable of occurring, and appears to be happening with regard to
eruvs. The record demonstrated "a widespread practice of individual-
ized decisions to grant or refuse permission to use property for reli-
gious purposes. These individualized assessments readily lend them-
selves to discrimination, and they also make it difficult to prove
discrimination in any case."3 4s Assuming this law can withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny, it is possible that the laws governing utility poles are
348 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statements of Sen. Hatch & Sen. Ken-
nedy).
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subsumed under the Act, and would therefore, fail for all the reasons
already discussed. 49
CONCLUSION
In this comment, I have tried to show that an eruv demonstrates
the holes in First Amendment jurisprudence. With respect to the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Court must establish the primacy of a single
test for violations. An eruv demonstrates the need for a more pre-
dictable test to establish violations of the Establishment Clause. It
also shows the advantages of Justice Brennan's tripartite permissible
accommodation analysis because of its predictability and consistency
with the underlying goal of securing personal autonomy with respect
to religious choices in contrast to the endorsement test, incapable of
producing conformity in the law, and the prediction of a particular
result. With regard to free exercise challenges, Tenafly Eruv Associa-
tion in particular would require the Supreme Court to explain its
concept of general applicability and the meaning of "individualized
exemptions" and hybrid exceptions that confuse the lower courts. I
have tried to demonstrate how looking at an eruv as speech helps
evaluate future approaches to the Free Exercise Clause that harmo-
nize free speech and free exercise jurisprudence. I have argued that
traditional rational basis review, and a rule that applies a compelling
interest test only when the government substantially burdens religion
will leave much religious exercise unprotected. Consequently, courts
should require that some evidence indicate the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment's objectives. Additionally, I have discussed how using selec-
tive enforcement as evidence of discrimination could be a helpful
tool in furthering formal equality. Lastly, I have proposed that a bal-
ancing approach that looks mainly at objective factors to determine
both the government's and the individuals' interests, and then weighs
the competing interests, could be applied to all free exercise cases
and could prove in practice to be even more protective of religious
liberty than the compelling interest standard.
Should the Supreme Court decide to grant certiorari, it should
conclusively determine which test it will use to determine Establish-
ment Clause challenges, and it should articulate a free exercise stan-
dard that, at a minimum, protects against religious discrimination.
39 Even if the law is upheld, there would be a question raised as to whether the evidence of
discrimination that was demonstrated is sufficiently related to the type of discrimination in-
volved in an eruv case to allow congress's enforcement power to extend to case of discrimina-
tion against an eruv. A complete discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this comment.
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